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TRANSTEMPORAL  SEPARATION  OF  POWERS  IN
THE  LAW  OF  PRECEDENT
Randy Beck*
INTRODUCTION
Judicial power consists of “jurisdiction,” the authority to speak
(dictio) the law (ius).1  As Chief Justice Marshall articulated the
judge’s role, it is “the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”2  In defining the judiciary’s “province,” Marshall
metaphorically staked out a territory in which courts may govern.
Within that territory, courts speak the law with authority, resolving dis-
putes and binding other actors.
The metaphor of a judicial “province” carries with it the implica-
tion of boundaries to the judge’s authority.  Courts may speak the law
authoritatively only within limits fixed by the Constitution and other
legal constraints.  Two borders have historically proved especially
important in defining judicial power.  First, courts may not issue rul-
ings on their own initiative.3  They address legal issues only in the
course of resolving cases brought to them by others.4  Second, in
 2012 Randy Beck.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
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purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
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1 See III OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 538 (1971) (listing “[t]he action of speaking”
as the first definition of “dictio”); IV id. at 984 (identifying “iurisdictio” as a combina-
tion of “iuris (gen. sg. of IVS2) + DICTIO”); IV id. (listing “[t]hat which is sanctioned
or ordained, law” as the first definition of “ius”).
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
3 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610–11 (1973) (noting that courts
are not “roving commissions” empowered “to pass judgment on the validity of the
Nation’s laws”).
4 See Rebecca Schoff, Note, Deciding on Doctrine: Anti-Miscegenation Statutes and the
Development of Equal Protection Analysis, 95 VA. L. REV. 627, 652 (2009) (“Courts, unlike
1405
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resolving litigated disputes, courts may only properly speak the “law,”5
employing sources and modes of reasoning recognized as “legal.”
Judges lack the freedom of legislators to pursue unguided policy
preferences.6
The power of courts to “say what the law is” must be harmonized
with the legitimate law-speaking powers of other governmental actors.
After all, one might just as properly say that it is “the province and
duty of the [legislative] department” to “say what the law is,” though at
a higher level of generality than courts.7  The “executive department”
can similarly be thought to speak the law when it issues regulations or
resolves administrative proceedings.8
Structural provisions of the Constitution and separation of pow-
ers principles allocate the law-speaking power among legislators,
courts, and executive officials.  Congress may enact legislation, pro-
vided it follows Article I procedures.9  However, courts or executive
agencies generally must apply the statute to particular disputes.  The
prohibition on legislative vetoes bars Congress from case-by-case appli-
cation of a statute unless it satisfies the demanding constitutional pro-
cess for passing new legislation.10  At the same time, the authority of
judicial and executive officials to speak the law in resolving statutory
legislatures, must wait for appropriate cases to come before them and may only react
to the issues presented in them.”).
5 See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 217 (1993) (dismissing peti-
tioner’s “policy arguments” as directed to “the wrong forum”); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 165 (“If some [executive] acts be examinable, and others not, there must
be some rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.”).
6 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921)
(“The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free.  He is not to innovate at
pleasure.  He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness.”); Adam Liptak, At 89, Stevens Contemplates the Law, and How to
Leave It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at N4 (“Asked if he would have answered the ques-
tion presented in [Kelo] differently had he instead been a legislator, Justice Stevens
said probably yes.  ‘One of the nice things about this job is that you don’t have to
make those decisions,’ he added.  ‘Very often you think, in this particular spot I don’t
have to be deciding the really hard case about what should be done.’”).
7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (describing the procedure for legislature to enact “a
Law”).
8 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–554 (2006) (outlining procedures for administrative rule
making and adjudication).
9 See supra note 7. R
10 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951–59 (1983) (holding that congressional
action to determine individual’s immigration status constituted legislative action
requiring bicameralism and presentment); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3
(prohibiting a “Bill of Attainder”); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946)
(“A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial
trial.” (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866))).
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disputes can be superseded if Congress amends the underlying
statute.11
Even in the unique context of constitutional law, care must be
exercised to discern the sometimes subtle boundaries between legiti-
mate law speaking by judges and other governmental actors.  The
“political question” doctrine, for instance, recognizes that some con-
stitutional questions lie outside the judicial province, falling within
the domain of the political branches.12  More controversially, “depart-
mentalists” would accord some level of autonomy in constitutional
interpretation to executive and legislative officials, even on issues pre-
viously addressed by the courts.13
This Article considers the law of precedent, including the doc-
trine of stare decisis, the distinction between holding and dictum, and
associated principles governing the extent to which judicial resolution
of a legal issue binds later courts.  The analysis begins with an observa-
tion: rules of precedent serve as a mechanism for allocating the power
to proclaim the law.  Here the concern is not distribution of power
among branches of the federal government.  Rather, the law of prece-
dent allocates power among courts of the past, present, and future.
Stare decisis and subsidiary principles regulate the extent to which
judges can explicate legal rules in a way that resolves not only the case
before the court, but also later cases involving litigants and facts as yet
unknown.14  The law of precedent, then, involves a transtemporal appli-
cation of separation of powers principles, allocating power among
judges serving at different points in time.15
11 See Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974) (stating that the
court generally must apply legal provisions effective at time of decision).
12 See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 240 (1993) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment) (noting that political question doctrine concerns “whether the Consti-
tution has given one of the political branches final responsibility for interpreting the
scope and nature of” some governmental power).
13 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83
MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1421 (1999) (“[T]he text, structure, and history of our Constitu-
tion do not give the power to interpret or enforce that document to any one branch
of our national government, including the federal courts.”).
14 See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 654 (1995) (“Prec-
edential constraint permits courts to influence outcomes in future cases that they may
now only dimly perceive.”).
15 The law of precedent is not the only context in which separation of powers
principles impact the temporal reach of those who control a branch of government.
For instance, while legislative initiatives may limit options available to successors,
establishing financial or legal obligations that future legislatures will be required to
respect, it has traditionally been understood that “one legislature may not bind the
legislative authority of its successors.”  United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839,
872 (1996) (plurality opinion); see, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
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The rule of stare decisis treats precedent as a constraint on suc-
cessor judges.16  A later judge does not write on a blank slate, but must
harmonize her decisions with the work of those who previously held
either the same office or a superior office in the judicial hierarchy.17
From this feature of precedential reasoning flows the familiar list of
values served by stare decisis, such as promoting the rule of law and
protecting reliance.18  When respected, rules of precedent advance
stability in the law, reducing the potential for arbitrary or unpredict-
able action by later judges.19
Without minimizing these benefits of presumptive adherence to
precedent, this Article emphasizes a significant countervailing theme,
one clearly present in the case law, but seldom highlighted in the aca-
demic literature.  Just as the law of precedent gives earlier judges a
check on the power of those who come behind, the doctrine some-
times allows later judges to minimize the precedential effect of earlier
decisions, providing a counterbalancing check on their predeces-
sors.20  The law of precedent, as applied by the United States Supreme
Court, empowers sitting judges to police overreaching in previous
opinions and to diminish the impact of rulings issued in the absence
of time-honored decisionmaking practices.  This power conferred on
later judges serves a disciplinary function, encouraging precedent-set-
Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 543, 570
(2005) (“If a previous majority imposed a supermajority confirmation rule by legisla-
tive rule, the subsequent majority could repeal the rule by a majority.”).
16 See James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1367
(1995) (stating that law involves “the invocation of the authority of prior texts to
shape and constrain what may be done in the present”); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis
and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (“The doctrine of stare
decisis would indeed be no doctrine at all if courts were free to overrule a past deci-
sion simply because they would have reached a different decision as an original
matter.”).
17 See David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 969, 973 (2008) (stating that precedent sharply limits options available to
judges).
18 See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 151 (2010) (overturning a
case “can create uncertainty and undermine the reliance that bench, bar, and public
have invested in the earlier decision”); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doc-
trine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 454 (2010) (protecting “reliance interests” through
stare decisis “has critical importance to the rule of law”); Lauren Vicki Stark, Note,
The Unworkable Unworkability Test, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665, 1669 (2005) (relying on
precedent supports stability and preserves legitimacy by fostering perception that
“decisions are governed by the rule of law and not by the vagaries of the political
process”).
19 See Stark, supra note 18, at 1669. R
20 If earlier judges establish the garden of precedent, later judges tend it, nurtur-
ing some plants, pruning others, and tearing some plants out by the roots.
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ting courts to remain within the proper scope of their authority and to
employ processes calculated to produce thoughtful and defensible
opinions.
As we develop this thesis, it will help to have a working under-
standing of what we mean by the law of precedent.  The relevant doc-
trine centers on the rule of stare decisis, the presumption that a legal
conclusion in an earlier opinion continues to govern later cases in the
same or inferior courts.21  Stare decisis has not been understood as
“an inexorable command” or a “mechanical formula,” but rather as “a
principle of policy.”22  Subsidiary principles implement and qualify
the stare decisis presumption, offering guidance regarding when and
to what extent a prior ruling merits precedential effect.  These subsidi-
ary principles often seem characterized less by bright lines than by
consideration of multiple relevant factors.23
Since the rule of stare decisis attaches only to a court’s previous
holdings, the distinction between holding and dictum lies at the heart
of the law of precedent.24  In the quest to honor prior holdings, ambi-
guities can arise regarding the scope of an earlier ruling.25  Judges
often possess a degree of leeway in determining how narrowly or
broadly a previous opinion should be read.26  Circumstances may also
influence the precedential weight accorded a prior holding.27  The
strength of the presumption that an earlier legal conclusion should be
21 See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424
(1986) (describing stare decisis as a “strong presumption” in statutory cases); Kurt T.
Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437,
1442 (2007) (“[S]tandard theories of stare decisis grant precedent at least presump-
tive validity . . . .”).
22 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
23 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (“[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed
to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law,
and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”);
BREYER, supra note 18, at 151 (stating “[t]he Court has referred to several factors that R
help answer the question” when to overturn an earlier case).
24 See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV.
953, 953 (2005) (“[S]tare decisis applies only to holdings of announced precedents
. . . .”).
25 See, e.g., infra notes 141–55 and accompanying text.
26 See CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 49 (“Sometimes the extension of a precedent R
goes to the limit of its logic.  Sometimes it does not go so far.  Sometimes by a process
of analogy it is carried even farther.  That is a tool which no system of jurisprudence
has been able to discard.”).
27 See, e.g., infra notes 170–79 and accompanying text.
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followed in later litigation can vary with the conditions under which it
was announced.
This Article contends that the subsidiary principles implementing
the rule of stare decisis often empower later judges to counter over-
reaching and less-than-careful decisionmaking by earlier courts.
Applying the distinction between holding and dictum, a court can
limit the scope of an opinion in which prior judges ambitiously
addressed issues unnecessary for resolution of the earlier case.28  Like-
wise, the Supreme Court has used the law of precedent as a means to
review the decisionmaking process associated with a prior opinion.
When the Court has issued a ruling based on substandard briefing or
truncated deliberations, or when it has failed to adequately explain
the grounds for an opinion, later Justices have felt free to deny or
minimize the precedential effect of the earlier decision.29  The full
weight of stare decisis attaches only when the precedent-setting court
sticks to the task of resolving the case before it, on the basis of plenary
briefing and argument, resulting in a reasoned opinion that cogently
defends the court’s conclusions on the issues addressed.
Just as the general rule of stare decisis allocates power to speak
the law, the authority of later judges to ignore dicta and to evaluate
the quality of predecessors’ decisionmaking processes effectively allo-
cates law-speaking power over time, checking the influence of the pre-
cedent-setting court.  Authorizing later courts to discount dicta
creates an incentive for judicial restraint and disables ambitious
judges from imposing their will in hypothetically-imagined future
cases.  Allowing later courts to disregard or narrowly construe deci-
sions that were poorly briefed or inadequately explained promotes
careful and thoughtful decisionmaking.  Thus, the pursuit of stability
inherent in the doctrine of stare decisis is qualified by countervailing
goals, such as encouraging judicial self-restraint and promoting thor-
ough, well informed consideration of legal issues.
This Article will describe and defend the law of precedent’s back-
ward-looking limitations on stare decisis and consider possible impli-
cations for several issues likely to come before the Supreme Court in
future litigation.  Part I considers three widely accepted expectations
regarding the role and operation of courts in our legal system.  First,
we establish courts to resolve disputes about the application of law to
particular cases.30  Second, in the course of resolving litigation, we
expect courts to conduct an adequate investigation of the relevant
28 See infra notes 131–59 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 160–246 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 49–82 and accompanying text.
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facts and applicable law before reaching a conclusion, a function facil-
itated in appellate courts through the process of briefing, argument,
and deliberation.31  Third, we ask judges, particularly at the appellate
level, to memorialize their conclusions in the form of a reasoned opin-
ion explaining the outcome they reach.32
Part II shows how the Supreme Court has employed the law of
precedent to enforce these expectations regarding the role and opera-
tion of courts.  The Justices have felt free to ignore legal conclusions
in a prior opinion that can be fairly characterized as dicta, meaning
that the Court reached beyond its role of resolving the dispute
brought to it by the parties and opined on questions unnecessary to
the outcome.33  When the Court has resolved an issue without ade-
quate briefing and argument, or with minimal deliberation, later Jus-
tices have sometimes narrowly construed the resulting holding or
afforded it diminished precedential weight.34  Likewise, the Court has
considered the absence or inadequacy of an opinion as a factor affect-
ing both the scope and weight of a prior ruling.35
Part III considers the potential application of these principles to
particular precedents addressing issues likely to come before the
Supreme Court again.  Part III.A focuses on Baker v. Nelson,36 a sum-
mary disposition in which the Supreme Court dismissed “for want of
[a] substantial federal question” claims that the traditional definition
of marriage violates federal constitutional rights of same-sex couples.
Though Baker represented a decision on the merits of the constitu-
tional claims asserted, and though the parties provided helpful (if
truncated) briefing on the issues in dispute, the lack of extended
deliberation and the absence of a written opinion would make it
unwise for the Supreme Court to rely on Baker as a definitive resolu-
tion of these issues in future proceedings.  Questions of this gravity
should be resolved through an opinion on the merits following ple-
nary briefing and full deliberation.  Indeed, I would recommend
abandonment of the Court’s case law attributing binding precedential
effect to such summary dispositions without opinion, since they seem
more akin to a denial of certiorari than a decision on the merits of the
claims presented.37
31 See infra notes 83–114 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 115–25 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 131–59 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 160–90 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 191–246  and accompanying text.
36 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
37 See infra notes 247–64 and accompanying text.
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Part III.B considers the liability of government officials occupying
supervisory roles based on constitutional violations committed by
their subordinates, an issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Ash-
croft v. Iqbal.38  Since Iqbal involved federal officials sued under the
federal common law principles of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,39 at the very least, Iqbal’s discussion of
supervisory liability should be treated as nonbinding dictum in cases
involving statutory claims against state officials under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.  More broadly, the Iqbal dissent made a reasonable argument
that the majority’s discussion of supervisory liability constituted dic-
tum even as to the federal officials at bar, since the Court’s analysis of
the pleadings would seem to render irrelevant its understanding of
the standards for supervisory liability.  In any event, to the extent one
thinks Iqbal included a holding on the liability of supervisory federal
officials, the Court could reasonably construe that holding narrowly in
future litigation in light of the minimal briefing provided to the Iqbal
Court on that issue.40
Part III.C considers the rule that the right to abortion continues
until a fetus is viable, in other words, capable of surviving (with medi-
cal assistance) outside the womb.  Under the principles discussed in
Part II, a strong argument can be made that the Supreme Court
should not accord binding precedential effect to the viability rule.
The Supreme Court first announced the viability rule in Roe v. Wade,41
reaffirming the rule in somewhat altered form in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.42  Since Roe concerned abortion reg-
ulations applicable from the outset of pregnancy, the viability rule
constituted dictum in the context of the Court’s opinion, a point con-
firmed by the internal deliberations about the case revealed in docu-
ments from the files of retired Justices.  The reaffirmation of the
viability rule in Casey constituted dictum as well, for much the same
reason.  Moreover, even if the viability rule had represented a holding
in Roe or Casey, it would be entitled to diminished precedential weight
since the Court in neither case enjoyed the benefit of plenary briefing
or argument regarding the duration of abortion rights.  Finally,
neither case offered a reasoned explanation for how the viability rule
can be derived from the Constitution.  Given that neither Roe’s adop-
tion nor Casey’s reaffirmation of the viability rule represented a hold-
38 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
39 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
40 See infra notes 265–310 and accompanying text.
41 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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ing of the Court, and that the Court has never squarely addressed the
issue on the basis of plenary briefing and argument, the Court should
not feel bound by the viability rule should the question of the dura-
tion of abortion rights arise in future litigation.43
I. THE PARAMETERS AND PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
Our occasional disagreements over the proper role of courts44
should not obscure the remarkably broad consensus concerning the
function we ask courts to perform in our legal system, the decision-
making processes we want them to employ, and the manner in which
we expect them to memorialize their decisions.  First, we ask courts to
resolve disputes among interested parties about the application of law
to particular circumstances.  Courts generally may not issue legal opin-
ions on their own initiative, but must instead settle disagreements
brought to them by others.45  Second, we expect courts to follow
established procedures for discovering the facts and investigating the
law relevant to a particular case.  At the judicial system’s appellate
levels, the anticipated procedures typically include adversarial brief-
ing, often followed by oral argument, and collaborative deliberation
by a multi-member panel.46  Third, especially at the appellate level, we
ask courts to explain their decisions in reasoned opinions that justify
the outcome through analysis of the relevant facts and applicable
law.47  We frown on ipse dixit opinions that announce a conclusion
without offering an adequate legal rationale.48  Let us consider in turn
each of these three widely shared expectations for judicial
decisionmaking.
A. Courts as Forums for Resolving Disputes
We establish courts so that parties who disagree about the appli-
cation of law in particular circumstances can ask judicial officers to
43 See infra notes 311–48 and accompanying text.
44 Compare, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) (defend-
ing textualist theory of constitutional interpretation designed to constrain judges),
with GOODWIN LIU ET AL., KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION (2010) (defending
theory of fidelity in constitutional interpretation in which judges adapt constitutional
text and principles in light of changed social conditions).
45 See infra notes 49–82 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 83–114 and accompanying text.
47 See Schauer, supra note 14, at 638 (citing the practice of giving reasons for R
decisions “[c]ommonly associated with appellate argument and appellate opinions”).
48 See id. at 634 (“To characterize a conclusion as an ipse dixit—a bare assertion
unsupported by reasons—is no compliment.”); infra notes 115–25 and accompanying
text.
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resolve their dispute.49  With respect to federal courts, the Constitu-
tion assigns judges this dispute-resolution function by granting juris-
diction over certain “cases” and “controversies.”50  The “case or
controversy” limitation has been implemented through the require-
ment of adverse parties,51 the rules of standing,52 and the prohibition
on advisory opinions.53
The case-specific nature of judicial decisionmaking distinguishes
the judicial power to “say what the law is” from the more general
rulemaking power of a legislative body.54  Courts may not speak the
law until litigants request resolution of a dispute arising from a partic-
ular set of facts.55  Courts as a general proposition endeavor to resolve
legal disputes based on pre-existing sources of law, rather than simply
imposing the judges’ preferred outcomes.56  By contrast, the power of
a legislature to speak the law is typically much broader than that of a
court.  A legislature may set forth a rule of law on its own initiative,
even if no person requested the measure or identified concrete cir-
cumstances to which it would apply.57  Legislators are not limited to
addressing one set of circumstances, but may craft a comprehensive
49 See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20 (1960) (holding that courts have
“power and duty . . . to decide cases and controversies properly before them”).
50 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
51 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937) (requiring that
the controversy touch “the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests”).
52 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“[A] plaintiff
must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.”).
53 See United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947)
(holding that Article III courts do not render advisory opinions).
54 Chief Justice Marshall made clear in Marbury that he had in mind the judici-
ary’s power to “say what the law is” in this case-specific context. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
55 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court
Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 1985 n.42
(2009) (“[C]ourts must wait until parties commence an action and the litigation pro-
cess has been completed before they can render a judgment applying the law to the
facts.”).
56 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50
B.C. L. REV. 685, 688–89 (2009) (“[J]udges are realists who acknowledge that, in some
cases, they make law and are guided by their personal experience and values, but
believe that nevertheless, personal views play little if any role in judicial decisionmak-
ing the vast majority of the time.”).
57 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) (“[A] state legislature can do
whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the
Constitution of the United States or of the State . . . .” (quoting Tyson & Brother
United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting))).
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legal regime anticipating a range of factual variations.58  A legislature
may adopt rules based on the legislators’ values, without drawing on
any pre-existing source apart from the legislative power.59
In a system premised on popular sovereignty, the distinction
between the law-speaking authority of legislatures and courts can be
traced to considerations of legitimacy.  “[I]n a democratic society leg-
islatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and conse-
quently the moral values of the people.”60  This is particularly true in
the federal system, where judges assume office through appointment,
rather than election, and enjoy constitutional protection against polit-
ical accountability.61  Insulation from the political process can be an
advantage when one seeks principled enforcement of legal and consti-
tutional norms.62  It can be a disadvantage, however, when establish-
ing broadly applicable rules, at least if one values the democratic
control our political system assumes.63
The broader law-speaking authority of legislative bodies can also
be justified in terms of institutional competence.64  A legislature is bet-
ter positioned than a court to make far-reaching, widely applicable
58 See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 110–11 (1994)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[A] State may enact a comprehensive regulatory system
to address an environmental problem or a threat to natural resources within the con-
fines of the Commerce Clause.”).
59 See Ofer Raban, The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of a Politicized Judiciary: A Philo-
sophical Critique, 8 J.L. SOC’Y 114, 131 (2007) (“Legislators who legislate decide what,
in their view, is the best course of action regarding a particular matter.  Judges do not
decide cases that way.”).
60 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality opinion) (alteration in
original) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
61 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; id. art. III, § 1.
62 See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 272
(2008) (stating that judicial independence is beneficial “to uphold the rule of law, to
check the excesses of the legislature and the executive, and to protect constitutional
rights and deep-seated values against majority encroachments”).
63 See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1886 (2001) (“That federal judges are unelected,
and federal courts presumed undemocratic, figures prominently as a justification for
Article III restraint.”).
64 See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1249, 1260–61 (2006) (“The ideal lawmaking body would be designed to under-
take a broad, integrated study of the area requiring attention.  It would issue public
notices so that affected persons could make submissions and participate in hearings.
It would seek advice from experts.  It would employ a staff to make a detailed, inde-
pendent study.  It would deliberate and wait as long as it considered useful before
promulgating a new rule.”).
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policy judgments.65  Its many members come from a variety of back-
grounds and bring to their legislative deliberations a large pool of col-
lective experience.66  A legislative body possesses the resources to
conduct an extensive inquiry into the need for and consequences of
particular legal changes.67  It can consider the distinct interests of all
who might be impacted by a measure, including those who lack the
means to hire an advocate or to speak for themselves.  A legislature
can also take the time it needs, studying an issue for years or even
decades before it acts.68
Courts are generally in a position inferior to legislative bodies
when it comes to making broadly applicable legal pronouncements.69
A court is typically a much smaller institution than a legislature and
commands fewer resources.70  Judges may come from a less diverse
range of socioeconomic backgrounds than legislators and typically
share the advantages, but also the homogenization, that attends law
65 See Josh Benson, The Past Does Not Repeat Itself, But It Rhymes: The Second Coming
of the Liberal Anti-Court Movement, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1071, 1081 (2008) (describ-
ing Cass Sunstein’s view: “Unlike a legislature, which can correct mistakes and draw
on expert information, the Court lacks serious policy expertise.  This means not only
that sweeping rulings are likely to be wrong, but they acquire precedential value that
makes them difficult to correct.”).
66 See generally JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMBERSHIP OF THE
111TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE (2010) (describing diverse educational backgrounds,
occupations, religious affiliations, gender, ethnicity, and other characteristics of mem-
bers of Congress); Adrian Vermeule, Living It Up, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 2, 2009,
12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/book/review/living-it?page=0,0 (noting legislature
includes “hundreds of representatives with diverse professional backgrounds and
perspectives”).
67 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (“The choice we are
urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process
after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can pro-
vide and courts cannot.”); Benson, supra note 65, at 1081 (noting that the legislature
can “draw on expert information”).
68 See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 385 (1999) (explaining how
Congress studied issues two decades before adopting federal death penalty
procedures).
69 See Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002) (sug-
gesting that the issue of inheritance by posthumously-conceived children “cr[ies] out
for lengthy, careful examination outside the adversary process, which can only
address the specific circumstances of each controversy that presents itself”); Leval,
supra note 64, at 1260 (explaining that due to structure and manner of operation,
courts are “poorly equipped to promulgate law”).
70 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (noting need to prevent diversion of courts’ “limited resources”).
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school training.71  A court must confine its deliberations to a record
compiled by the parties,72 who often have motives to offer selective
portrayals of the relevant facts.73  The court may possess little insight
into how its ruling might affect those not involved in the litigation,74
and it generally resolves cases under considerable time pressure.75
Limiting court jurisdiction to the task of resolving discrete legal
disputes gives rise to the distinction between holding and dictum.76  A
court’s holding carries precedential authority because, by definition,
it encompasses those parts of an opinion necessary to the judges’
assigned task of resolving the case.77  When a court articulates the
holding of a case, it carries out the function it is authorized to per-
form—settling the dispute between the parties.  Conversely, state-
ments in dicta lack authority because they are not required for the
court to perform its role of resolving the pending legal dispute.  In
offering dicta, the judge goes beyond the authorized judicial
function.78
71 See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judicial Diversity, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 45, 46–49 (2009) (dis-
cussing lack of diversity with respect to gender, race, and professional backgrounds);
id. at 54 (“All federal judges are lawyers—distinguished ones.”); Vermeule, supra note
66 (characterizing a court as a “committee of aging lawyers on the bench, with limited
information and life experience and no philosophical or penological training”).
72 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 687–88 (2002)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that appellate
review of injunction is confined to record before district court); BREYER, supra note
18, at 114 (“[Courts] cannot look for information beyond [the] record.”); Leval, R
supra note 64, at 1261 (“Usually, the only input the court receives is from the litigants.
The court is barred from researching the facts privately on its own.” (footnote
omitted)).
73 See Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS 237, 287 (2008) (discussing how litigants may “shade facts” due to interest in
litigation).
74 See Benson, supra note 65, at 1081 (noting that a court “lacks serious policy
expertise”).
75 See BREYER, supra note 18, at 114 (“Judges have little time to spend on any one R
case . . . .”); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Calendar of the
Justices: How the Supreme Court’s Timing Affects Its Decisionmaking, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183,
213 (2004) (explaining how the Supreme Court has “barely two months” to issue
decisions in cases argued in April); Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litiga-
tion Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L. 771, 777–78 (2009) (discussing the rapid decisionmak-
ing in Delaware appellate courts).
76 See CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 29 (“[T]he thing adjudged comes to us often- R
times swathed in obscuring dicta, which must be stripped off and cast aside.”).
77 See Leval, supra note 64, at 1260 (“Courts make law only as a consequence of
the performance of their constitutional duty to decide cases.  They have no constitu-
tional authority to establish law otherwise.”).
78 See id. (“[M]aking law through dictum . . . . is beyond our authority.”).
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From a more functional perspective, the Supreme Court has
argued that a court’s dicta are less reliable than its holdings.  A court
devotes its attention principally to the case before it, rather than cases
that might hypothetically arise in the future.  Chief Justice Marshall
famously explained the reasons for denying precedential effect to
dicta:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which
those expressions are used.  If they go beyond the case, they may be
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent
suit when the very point is presented for decision.  The reason of
this maxim is obvious.  The question actually before the Court is
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.  Other prin-
ciples which may serve to illustrate it are considered in their rela-
tion to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other
cases is seldom completely investigated.79
Thus, concerns about the legitimacy of a court’s unnecessary resolu-
tion of legal issues interrelate with concerns about institutional com-
petence and the quality of the court’s decisionmaking process.80  The
circumstances in which a court is authorized to speak the law are also
the circumstances in which it can be expected to do so most reliably
and with the greatest forethought.
This does not mean a court necessarily acts improperly when it
includes dicta in an opinion.  A court probably should consider how
the principles underlying its ruling might apply in light of predictable
variations in the facts.  Offering guidance for later cases, or highlight-
ing potential distinguishing factors, can be useful for future parties
and courts.81  But the inclusion of dicta in an opinion can also be a
form of judicial overreaching—an attempt to address unlitigated
79 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 399–400 (1821).
80 See CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 29–30 (“I own that it is a good deal of a mystery R
to me how judges, of all persons in the world, should put their faith in dicta.  A brief
experience on the bench was enough to reveal to me all sorts of cracks and crevices
and loopholes in my own opinions when picked up a few months after delivery, and
reread with due contrition.”); Leval, supra note 64, at 1255 (“An important aspect of
my point is that courts are more likely to exercise flawed, ill-considered judgment,
more likely to overlook salutary cautions and contraindications, more likely to pro-
nounce flawed rules, when uttering dicta than when deciding their cases.  The prac-
tices I discuss impair the quality and reliability of our performance.”).
81 See Leval, supra note 64, at 1253 (“[D]icta often serve extremely valuable pur-
poses.  They can help clarify a complicated subject.  They can assist future courts to
reach sensible, well-reasoned results.  They can help lawyers and society to predict the
future course of the court’s rulings.  They can guide future courts to adopt fair and
efficient procedures.”).
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issues and resolve future disputes beyond the precedent-setting
court’s jurisdiction.82
B. Briefing, Argument, and Deliberation
If the legal system’s only goal were resolution of disputes, we
could replace judges with coin flips and games of chance (at much
lower cost).83  We invest substantial resources in our legal system
because we believe law can play a socially beneficial role in influenc-
ing behavior.84  That belief rests on an assumption that law possesses
some degree of determinacy or predictability, arising from the interac-
tion of language, reason, and shared interpretive practices.85  We
assume that the plausible outcomes for a particular legal inquiry—
outcomes consistent with the language of the law, understood in light
of the conventions of legal interpretation and the dictates of reason—
fall within a sufficiently narrow range to permit suitably determinate
guidance to further the goals that motivated lawmakers.  The need for
relatively predictable legal decisions means that some judicial opin-
ions will be better than others; some will be more accurate (or,
indeed, truthful) in describing the relevant facts, or more faithful in
applying the relevant legal directives in light of our shared interpre-
tive norms.86
In preparing to write a factually accurate opinion that faithfully
applies the law, a judge must undertake an educational process.  At a
minimum, the educational process required to resolve a case involves
investigation of facts relevant to the dispute, typically through compi-
lation of a record at the trial-court level or familiarization with rele-
82 See id. at 1250 (“We judges regularly undertake to promulgate law through
utterance of dictum made to look like a holding—in disguise, so to speak.  When we
do so, we seek to exercise a lawmaking power that we do not rightfully possess.”).
83 Cf. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23–27 (West 2010) (mandating that in case of
equal votes for same office, election should be decided by lot); Huber v. Reznick, 437
N.E.2d 828, 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (ruling that an electoral contest was properly
resolved by coin flip).
84 See Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 1, 34 (2011) (suggesting that the law seeks “to influence human behavior in
desirable ways”).
85 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 441–42 (1989) (asserting that there is agreement on background norms of statu-
tory interpretation making judicial interpretations predictable).
86 See Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 969, 971–74 (2011) (discussing legal reasoning and candor as grounds for evalu-
ating judicial opinions).
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vant portions of the record in an appellate court.87  In many cases,
judges will also need to broaden their familiarity with applicable law
through review of pertinent legal directives and precedent interpret-
ing those directives.88
Appellate judges, such as the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, could theoretically conduct the factual and legal
investigations necessary to their work without the input of the parties,
perhaps after minimal guidance as to the issues in dispute.  Drawing
from centuries of experience, though, our courts have concluded that
adversarial briefing and oral argument by lawyers for the parties
enhances the educational process necessary for appellate decision-
making.89  The Supreme Court places such reliance on the assistance
of attorneys that the Justices often refuse to adjudicate issues—even
issues undeniably relevant to a given dispute—in the absence of ade-
quate briefing and argument.90  Just as frequently, concurring and dis-
87 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL 11 (1991) (“When an opin-
ion turns on the specifics of testimony or on what occurred in the court room, there
may be no substitute for reading the relevant portions of the transcript.”); Lebovits et
al., supra note 73, at 287 (“Trial judges must engage in fact finding and resolve con-
flicts between different versions of the facts . . . .”).
88 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 87, at 9 (suggesting that before writing opin-
ion, judge must “identify the applicable rules of law”).
89 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 331 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recog-
nizing the “aid which adequate briefing and argument lends to the determination of
an important issue” (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting))).
90 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 168–70 (2004) (refus-
ing to resolve issue addressed by dissent where issue had not been resolved below and
went “well beyond the scope of the briefing and, indeed, the question presented”);
USPS. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 7 (2001) (“[E]ven if the adequacy of [agency’s method
of reviewing prior disciplinary actions] were before us, we lack sufficient briefing on
its specific functioning in this case.”); Ky. Dep’t of Cntys. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
465 n.5 (1989) (declining to consider whether consent decree could create liberty
interest where issue not briefed and argued, not discussed below, and unnecessary to
decision); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 n.11 (1987) (noting dissent resolved
issue of vagueness of regulation “[a]lthough the issue was not briefed or argued by
the parties”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 827 n.4 (1986) (“We have
confined the opinion to the issues presented by the parties and express no view on
the question discussed by the justices who write separately. . . . Because the issue of
disqualification of a single member of a multimember panel arises in a variety of
factual contexts, sound judicial practice wisely counsels judges to avoid unnecessary
declarations on issues not presented, briefed, or argued.” (citation omitted)); EEOC
v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 66 n.17 (1984) (explaining that the parties shared an
assumption about the Title VII enforcement question, so “the issue has not been
briefed,” and that the Court “loathe[d] to take an analytical path unmarked by the
litigants,” especially in complex area of law); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 637 (1975) (remanding for consider-
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senting Justices criticize the majority for taking up issues the briefs did
not address or treated in a cursory fashion.91  The significance attrib-
uted to briefing and argument in both majority and nonmajority opin-
ions demonstrates recognition that the quality of briefing affects the
ation of issue not considered below and “not briefed and argued fully in this Court”);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958) (declining to address issues “with-
out the benefit of argument by the parties”); United States v. Reading Co., 228 U.S.
158, 160 (1913) (“Upon this issue the transcript is confusing and the briefs inade-
quate.  The court therefore deems it wise in the exercise of its judgment to decline
any determination of the question upon the present record.”).
91 See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 553 (1999) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (“The absence of briefing or meaningful argu-
ment by the parties makes this Court’s gratuitous decision to volunteer an opinion on
this nonissue particularly ill advised.”); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 138–39,
143–48 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that the court should not decide
issue not clearly included in questions presented, resulting in lack of notice and inad-
equate briefing); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 398 (1992) (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[I]n the present case, the majority casts aside long-
established First Amendment doctrine without the benefit of briefing and adopts an
untried theory.”); Teague, 489 U.S. at 319–20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) (questioning “the propriety of making such an important
change in the law without briefing or argument,” but partially agreeing with plural-
ity’s resolution of retroactivity issue); id. at 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Today a
plurality of this Court, without benefit of briefing and oral argument, adopts a novel
threshold test for federal review of state criminal convictions on habeas corpus.”); Sun
Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 739 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (criticizing majority’s “offhand treatment” of issue not
briefed or argued); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 700–02 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the majority erred in addressing rea-
sonable suspicion issue “not presented, briefed, or argued by the parties” and not
fully reviewed in trial court); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 676–77 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criti-
quing the “unwisdom of overruling [Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)] without full-
dress argument”); see also Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 410 (2001)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing majority’s discussion premature where a related issue
was not raised and thus “the issue has not been briefed”); cf. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 120 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the major-
ity should not view prior case articulating rule as determinative on issue of retroactiv-
ity where “[t]he absence of briefing, argument, or even mention of the question
belies any suggestion that the issue was given thoughtful consideration”); United
States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 184 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part)
(rejecting proposition suggested in dicta in prior case, but “not briefed”). But see
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 83–86 (majority opinion) (arguing that the question was consid-
ered by courts below, fairly included in questions presented and briefed by parties);
id. at 103–05 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the question was fairly
included in one of the questions presented and briefed by parties).
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quality of the Court’s opinions; inadequate briefs can produce poor
decisions.92
Consider some ways that briefing and argument by the parties
might contribute to the quality of decisionmaking in an appellate
court.  At the very least, the briefing process will save time and effort
for the judges.  The parties can identify relevant testimony and exhib-
its more quickly than an appellate judge.93  The litigants can also
accelerate the search for relevant legal sources, reducing the risk that
the court will overlook important precedents and principles that its
decision should take into account.94  The time saved by adversarial
briefing can be devoted to higher-order tasks, like thinking through
the implications of a particular outcome in light of the court’s larger
body of jurisprudence.
Our preference for adversarial briefing and argument, however,
does not flow simply from the desire to preserve judicial resources.
Allowing each party to present its own case may also highlight impor-
tant considerations the judge might otherwise overlook.  The human
mind sometimes begins forming views on an issue based on relatively
minimal information.  Judges may reach tentative conclusions when
they first hear about a case, but those conclusions will often prove
untenable in light of a more complete understanding of the dispute.95
Hearing a party’s position on contested issues can force a judge to
question his or her assumptions about the case and take account of
information undermining the judge’s initial reaction.
More broadly, adversarial briefing can help to overcome “blind
spots” arising from a judge’s background.96  Each judge comes to a
92 The Court made this point recently when it overruled Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194 (2001), which had required judges to decide constitutional issues presented by a
§ 1983 or Bivens plaintiff before moving on to consider the question of qualified
immunity.  As one reason for freeing judges to start with the issue of qualified immu-
nity, the Court explained that where “the briefing of constitutional questions is woe-
fully inadequate,” demanding an opinion on the constitutional issue would “create a
risk of bad decisionmaking.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 239 (2009).
93 See SUP. CT. R. 26.1 (2010) (requiring submission of joint appendix including
“parts of the record that the parties particularly wish to bring to the Court’s
attention”).
94 See SUP. CT. R. 24.1(i) (requiring parties to cite authorities relied upon).
95 See Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232, 252 (2002)
(suggesting judges sometimes engage in signaling that “solicits the parties to submit
additional information that might change the judge’s tentative thinking,” prompting
“new evidence that can aid the judge in reaching a more fully informed decision”).
96 See Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New
World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 104–05 (2009)
(“[J]udges too are people with blind spots and thus exhibit predictable cognitive fail-
ures.”); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., How Do Judges Decide?  A Course for Non-Lawyers, 106
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case from a particular perspective shaped by the judge’s exper-
iences.97  A judge needs to see what the dispute looks like from the
perspectives of the parties.98  Getting a different angle on the issues in
controversy may help a judge remove the blinders created by his or
her background and see more clearly the “practical ramifications” of a
particular outcome for those most directly affected.99  The parties can
present their positions in the strongest possible terms and give the
best exposition of how their interests will be impacted by the
litigation.
Adversarial briefing likewise allows for a thorough sifting of the
positions advanced by the contending parties.  Many arguments may
appear persuasive when considered in isolation.  “The first to present
his case seems right, till another comes forward and questions
him.”100  In adversarial litigation, each side has an incentive to high-
light omissions and expose flaws in the other side’s position, rounding
out the court’s awareness of the relevant facts and law and the
strengths and weaknesses of potential legal resolutions.
For cases argued in the United States Supreme Court, the process
of briefing and argument structures the dispute in the form of an
extended dialogue between the parties.  At the initial stage of asking
the Court to take the case, there will typically be a petition for certio-
rari, a brief in response, and sometimes a reply brief.101  The Court’s
decision to grant certiorari is followed by submission of lengthier
briefs on the merits,102 with each party potentially supported by multi-
ple amici curiae.103  The parties get a final opportunity to influence
DICK. L. REV. 773, 796 (2002) (“We are all children of our time, which means that we
all have blind spots, emphatically including our judges . . . .”).
97 See, e.g., Ifill, supra note 71, at 55 (arguing that judges bring “accumulated
knowledge” from their experiences to the resolution of cases); Liptak, supra note 6, at
44 (“‘I’ve confessed to many people that I think my personal experience has had an
impact on what I’ve done,’ [Justice Stevens] said.  ‘Time and time again, not only for
myself but for other people on the court, during discussions of cases you bring up
experiences that you are familiar with.’”).
98 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 398 (1992) (White, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (explaining that full briefing and argument gives parties and
amici “the opportunity to apprise us of the impact of a change in the law”).
99 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (critiquing
majority for reaching out to resolve issue with cursory briefing and no argument;
decision may have “untoward practical ramifications” for state criminal justice
proceedings).
100 Proverbs 18:17 (NIV).
101 See SUP. CT. R. 12, 15 (2010).
102 See SUP. CT. R. 25.
103 See SUP. CT. R. 37.
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the Court’s thinking through oral presentation of their positions.104
This extensive course of briefing and argument gives each side multi-
ple opportunities to make their strongest points and highlight weak-
nesses in the other side’s submissions.
Public oral argument offers additional advantages that can
enhance the judicial decisionmaking process, setting a point in time
by which the judges will have read the briefs and developed a basic
familiarity with the issues in dispute.105  The oral argument gives advo-
cates an opportunity to respond to particular issues of concern to the
decision makers.106  Oral argument also shows the public that the
judges are personally engaged in considering the issues presented and
have not simply left matters in the hands of their law clerks.107  Finally,
in the context of the Supreme Court, many have noted that the ques-
tions asked by the Justices are often directed to one another, as much
as to the parties.108  The oral argument begins the process of collabo-
rative deliberation that will lead to a final opinion.
While briefing and argument initiate the process of judicial edu-
cation, that educational process continues through private study and
104 See SUP. CT. R. 28.
105 See James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Source of Information or “Dog and Pony
Show”?: Judicial Information Seeking During U.S. Supreme Court Oral Argument, 1963–1965
& 2004–2009, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 90 (2010) (“Oral argument . . . is the
organizing point for the entire judicial process.  The judges read the briefs, do the
research, and talk to their law clerks to prepare for the argument.  The voting confer-
ence is held right after the oral argument—immediately after it in the court of
appeals, shortly after it in the Supreme Court.  And without disputing in any way the
dominance of the briefing in the decisional process, it is natural, with the voting com-
ing so closely on the heels of oral argument, that the discussion at conference is going
to focus on what took place at argument.” (quoting John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy
and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 70 (2005))).
106 See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 750 (9th ed. 2007)
(“[O]ften my whole notion of what a case is about crystallizes at oral argument.”
(quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Harvard Law School Occasional Pamphlet No. 9,
22–23 (1967))).
107 Cf. David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, LEGAL AFFAIRS (May/June
2005), at 27, 28 (discussing responsibility of Justices to supervise law clerks and not
give them too much control over official responsibilities).
108 See Phillips & Carter, supra note 105, at 89 (“I soon learned that . . . question-
ing from the bench was . . . a form of lobbying for votes.” (alterations in original)
(quoting PHILLIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH 72 (1995))); id. (“[A] second
important function of oral argument can be gleaned from the fact that it is the only
time before conference discussion of the case later in the week when all of the judges
are expected to sit on the bench and concentrate on one particular case.  The judges’
questions, although nominally directed to the attorney arguing the case, may in fact
be for the benefit of their colleagues.” (quoting WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME
COURT 244 (2001))).
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collegial deliberation.  Since the parties’ presentations are driven by
an agenda of prevailing in the litigation, it is important that judges
have time to supplement the parties’ research and engage in more
neutral and dispassionate consideration of the issues in dispute.  The
judges need to determine whether the parties have accurately charac-
terized the record and the case law, to consider issues the parties did
not raise, and to anticipate implications of different outcomes for
future disputes where the facts might differ.109
After oral argument, appellate judges typically begin an extended
process of continued research and collective deliberation.  The devel-
opment of consensus among a group of judges on a multi-member
appellate court may smooth out some of the biases and idiosyncrasies
that can lead a single judge to a flawed result.110  Moreover, multiple
judges may challenge one another to consider possibilities an individ-
ual judge would overlook.111  In the Supreme Court, the Justices meet
soon after oral argument for a private conference that facilitates this
process of personal study and collaborative deliberation.112  The Jus-
tices explain their tentative views on the proper outcome of an argued
case.113  The conference results in initial opinion assignments,114 and
the process of study and deliberation continues as the Justices circu-
109 See Gerald Lebovits & Lucero Ramirez Hidalgo, Advice to Law Clerks: How to
Draft Your First Judicial Opinion, 36 WESTCHESTER BAR J. 29, 30 (2009) (explaining that
parties will sometimes omit issues or state them incorrectly).
110 See CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 177 (“The eccentricities of judges balance one R
another.  One judge looks at problems from the point of view of history, another from
that of philosophy, another from that of social utility, one is a formalist, another a
latitudinarian, one is timorous of change, another dissatisfied with the present; out of
the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something which has a constancy and
uniformity and average value greater than its component elements.”); Chris Scaper-
landa, Approximating Due Process, 28 REV. LITIG. 983, 994 (2009) (“The dialogue
among judges necessary to reach a conclusion and the presence of two votes to out-
weigh any personal biases or blind spots that might influence one judge’s decision all
suggest that a three-judge panel is more likely to be error free than a decision by a
single judge.”).
111 See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts,
97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2310 (1999) (“The process of collective deliberation can
improve autonomous decisionmaking.  A collegial sharing of ideas brings multiple
possibilities and perspectives to each Justice’s attention, and increases the likelihood
that she will explore all plausible positions.  Moreover, each Justice is encouraged to
hone and improve her own positions in response to critical peer scrutiny and persua-
sion.” (footnote omitted)).
112 See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 22.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 15 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Sunshine in the Third Branch, 16
WASHBURN L.J. 559, 559–60 n.1 (1977)).
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late and comment on drafts of majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions.
In short, appellate courts such as the United States Supreme
Court rely on briefing and argument to enhance the quality of the
decisions issued by judges.  Inadequate briefing and argument con-
tribute to inadequate judicial opinions.  Good briefing and argument
do not guarantee good decisions, but they increase the likelihood that
judges will produce thoughtful rulings, truthful about the relevant
facts, faithful to the applicable law, and useful in accomplishing the
goals the legal system seeks to advance.
C. Reasoned Explanation of Judicial Decisions
In addition to educating themselves as to the relevant facts and
applicable law, we ask courts to write opinions that explain the legal
analysis leading to an announced outcome.115  Just as briefing, argu-
ment, and collaborative deliberation tend to enhance the quality of
judicial decisions, the process of writing opinions can improve judicial
decisionmaking as well.  Writing out one’s legal analysis serves as a
discipline that can force judges to think more carefully and systemati-
cally about the issues in dispute.116  The requirement of written justifi-
cation forces a judge to move from a gut reaction to a reasoned
conclusion.117  Many judges recognize this benefit of authoring opin-
ions and will sometimes express only tentative views after oral argu-
ment because they want to see if a particular analysis “will write,” in
other words, if it can be persuasively developed in the form of a judi-
cial opinion.118  The writing process forces the court to face important
issues and decide whether a particular outcome can be explained in a
defensible way.
When a court offers persuasive explanations for its decisions, its
opinions tend to bolster the court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the pub-
115 See White, supra note 16, at 1366 (explaining that judicial opinion includes R
“the reasons why the result was reached”).
116 See Schauer, supra note 14, at 657–58 (discussing how the requirement of giv- R
ing reasons for decisions can counteract problems like “bias, self-interest, insufficient
reflection, or simply excess haste”).
117 See Sherry, supra note 86, at 973 (“Transparency is especially vital for unelected
judges in a constitutional democracy, because the visible rationality of a transparent
opinion is a necessary substitute for the missing democratic accountability.  It is part
of what leads the public to acknowledge the legitimacy of a judicial decision.”).
118 See Schauer, supra note 14, at 652 (mentioning phenomenon of judges strug- R
gling with opinion before concluding it “won’t write”).
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lic.119  This matters because the efficacy of courts in fulfilling their
functions depends to a large extent on public acquiescence.  Courts
have only limited capacity to compel submission, so voluntary compli-
ance by the public is critical.120  Widespread doubt about the legiti-
macy of the courts would profoundly impact their ability to perform
their public functions.
Issuance of written opinions also provides one of the few means
of holding courts accountable,121 permitting review and critique of
the legal analyses judges offer in support of their decisions.122  The
transparency afforded by judicial opinions allows the public to express
disapproval and criticize judges who reach decisions the public con-
siders poorly reasoned or legally indefensible.123  A written opinion
can also highlight options available to political actors with means of
responding to a court’s decision.
Reasoned opinions explaining judicial outcomes promote the
rule of law values underlying the law of precedent.124  A court’s expla-
nation of the principles applied and its analysis of how those princi-
ples interact with the relevant facts can offer guidance as to the
possible application of those principles in later cases.125  In this man-
ner, the publication of judicial opinions provides direction to lawyers,
litigants, and future courts.
119 See id. at 658 (“[W]hen decisionmakers expect voluntary compliance, or when
they expect respect for decisions because the decisions are right rather than because
they emanate from an authoritative source, then giving reasons becomes a way to
bring the subject of the decision into the enterprise.”).
120 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
121 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 87, at vii (“[I]n the writing lies the test of the
thinking that underlies [the opinion].”); id. at 1 (“[P]reparation of a written opinion
imposes intellectual discipline on the author, requiring the judge to clarify his or her
reasoning and assess the sufficiency of precedential support.”).
122 See Lebovits et al., supra note 73, at 273 (“[Opinions] provide accountability
because they are available to the public, the litigants, and higher courts to read and
review.”).
123 See White, supra note 16, at 1368 (“The criticism of opinions, on all these R
grounds—rational, political, moral—is an essential part of the activity of law.  It is
crucial to legal practice, for it is on the basis of such criticism that one will argue for
or against the continued authority of a particular opinion or line of opinions.”).
124 See Schauer, supra note 14, at 654 (arguing for adherence to reasons in earlier R
opinions for “cross-temporal stability, and for intrainstitutional stability in the face of
changing personnel”).
125 See White, supra note 16, at 1368 (“[T]he way the opinion is written has large R
consequences for the future.  It deeply affects and shapes the way we think and argue
and, in so doing, constitute ourselves through the law.”).
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II. THE LAW OF PRECEDENT AS A CHECK ON PRIOR COURTS
Discussions of the law of precedent often focus on the presump-
tion against reconsidering prior decisions.126  Considerable advan-
tages flow from presumptive adherence to earlier rulings.  Following
previous decisions means that like cases will be resolved in like man-
ner, promoting “faith in the even-handed administration of justice”127
and guarding against “prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or
fitfulness.”128  Adherence to precedent increases the predictability of
legal outcomes and protects those who rely on judicial pronounce-
ments, promoting the rule of law.129  Stare decisis also preserves judi-
cial resources, since “the labor of judges would be increased almost to
the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every
case.”130
When one focuses principally on the presumption against over-
ruling prior decisions, the law of precedent clearly empowers earlier
courts at the expense of those that come later.  This Article, however,
seeks to present a more nuanced picture of the way the law of prece-
dent operates in practice.  A complete discussion of the Supreme
Court’s stare decisis jurisprudence must take account of the Court’s
willingness to deny precedential effect to dicta and to narrowly con-
strue prior decisions in ways that minimize their impact.  Moreover,
not all judicial decisions carry equal precedential weight; the Court
feels more freedom to reconsider some rulings than others.  A more
comprehensive picture of the law of precedent shows that the Court
balances values such as promoting stability and protecting reliance
against countervailing values.  While the law of precedent does give
precedent-setting courts the capacity to bind their successors, it also
equips successor judges with tools to rein in excesses and discourage
suboptimal decisionmaking practices by their predecessors.
The first Part of this Article considered three expectations
regarding the role and operation of courts in our legal system: (1)
126 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992)
(plurality opinion); BREYER, supra note 18, at 151–56 (discussing factors influencing R
the decision whether to overrule a prior decision).
127 CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 34. R
128 Id. at 112.
129 See Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 79 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (describing as “principal pur-
poses” of stare decisis “to protect reliance interests and to foster stability in the law”);
Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of
law.”).
130 CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 149. R
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that courts should resolve disputes brought to them by others con-
cerning the application of law to particular circumstances, (2) that
courts should render decisions with the benefit of full briefing, argu-
ment, and deliberation, and (3) that courts should explain the legal
analyses supporting the conclusions they reach.  We will now examine
the Supreme Court’s application of the law of precedent to enforce
these expectations.  As we will see, the Court narrowly construes prior
decisions, accords diminished precedential weight, or denies stare
decisis effect altogether when an earlier Court purported to resolve
issues not raised by the case before it, when it acted based on inade-
quate briefing or cursory deliberation, or when it failed to adequately
explain the reasoning underlying a legal conclusion.
A. Denying Binding Effect to Dicta
The law of precedent places controlling weight on the distinction
between holding and dictum.131  The only portions of an opinion
entitled to binding effect under the rule of stare decisis are those nec-
essary to resolution of the dispute pending before the precedent-set-
ting court.  Portions of an opinion that constitute dicta may be
considered for their persuasive value, but need not be followed in
later litigation.132
We previously noted that the distinction between holding and
dictum tracks the Court’s jurisdiction as an institution authorized to
resolve disputes about the application of law to particular circum-
stances.133  Considered as a manifestation of separation of powers doc-
trine, the holding/dictum distinction allows later courts to remedy
overreaching by their judicial predecessors.134  Dicta can of course be
a legitimate tool of judicial decisionmaking, even for a minimalist
court.  Courts may use dicta, for instance, to illustrate the limited
scope of a particular ruling and alert lawyers, judges, and legislators to
factual variations that could call for application of different princi-
ples.135  But dicta can also represent an attempt by the precedent-set-
131 See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
132 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
737–38 (2007) (plurality opinion) (holding that dicta from a prior case was not bind-
ing in later one).
133 See supra Part I.A.
134 See Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 592 n.5
(1993) (declining to give effect to dicta in prior cases).
135 For instance, in striking down a statute criminalizing consensual homosexual
sodomy, the majority in Lawrence v. Texas employed dicta to identify a number of
potentially relevant facts that were not present in the case under review.  The majority
wrote: “The present case does not involve minors.  It does not involve persons who
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ting court to reach outside the bounds of its authority in an ambitious
attempt to control the outcome in future cases with different facts.
The Supreme Court has recognized that dicta can “insult” the virtue
of judicial restraint, and that a later court “would add injury to insult
by according them precedential effect.”136  The holding/dictum dis-
tinction allows a later court to ignore an earlier opinion to the extent
the first court exceeded its authority.
The distinction between holding and dictum implicates concerns
about the institutional competence of courts and the importance of
adversarial litigation.  Parties involved in a lawsuit have little reason to
provide extensive briefing and argument on issues unnecessary to the
resolution of the particular case.137  Therefore, an opinion’s dicta will
often concern issues “not fully debated” by the parties.138  Likewise, as
Chief Justice Marshall explained in Cohens v. Virginia,139 while “[t]he
question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and con-
sidered in its full extent,” other issues are “seldom completely investi-
gated.”140  Consequently, there is a higher risk that a court
formulating dicta will possess incomplete information than a court
addressing issues directly involved in the parties’ dispute.
This brings us to the question of how courts should distinguish
holding from dictum in interpreting an earlier opinion.  Professor
Michael Dorf has noted that the Supreme Court lacks a single, uni-
form approach to drawing the holding/dictum distinction.  The
Court sometimes views a prior holding narrowly, encompassing only
the facts of the earlier case and the outcome, but in other cases, the
Court reads the holding broadly to encompass both the outcome and
the rationale articulated by the precedent-setting court.141  Professor
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might
not easily be refused.  It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.  It does not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.”  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
136 Demisay, 508 U.S. at 592 n.5.
137 An exception might be ideological litigation, in which an interest group has
more concern about advancing a particular agenda than the material interests at
stake in the lawsuit.
138 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 737
(2007) (plurality opinion) (quoting Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363
(2006)) (“[W]e are not bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point
now at issue was not fully debated.” (quoting id.)).
139 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821).
140 Id. at 399–400.
141 See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 1999 (1994)
(“[F]ederal courts sometimes treat the question whether a particular judicial state-
ment is holding or dictum as a feature of the facts and outcome of the case, but other
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Dorf would prefer a policy of always reading the holding of an opin-
ion to include the court’s rationale, even when its reasoning would
cover factual scenarios not present in the case at bar.142  The Justices,
though, have often narrowly construed prior opinions, failing to
embrace conclusions logically suggested by the earlier Court’s
reasoning.
Two examples from recent terms illustrate the point.  Consider
first the decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,143 in which the
Court concluded that a statute enacted by Congress under the Article
I Indian Commerce Clause could not abrogate a state’s sovereign
immunity.144  The Court’s rationale in Seminole Tribe seemingly
extended to any legislation enacted under the Article I powers of Con-
gress: “The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under
Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitu-
tional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”145  The majority
and dissenting opinions in Seminole Tribe therefore assumed that the
holding of the case would also prevent Congress from abrogating state
sovereign immunity based on the Article I Bankruptcy Clause.146  Nev-
ertheless, the Court reached the opposite conclusion when directly
confronted with the Bankruptcy Clause issue in Central Virginia Com-
munity College v. Katz.147  Even though the rationale of Seminole Tribe
would seem to encompass all Article I powers, the Katz majority con-
cluded that mentions of the Bankruptcy Clause in Seminole Tribe repre-
sented nonbinding dicta.148
times they treat this question as a feature of the rationale of the prior opinion under
analysis.” (footnote omitted)).
142 See id. at 2040.
143 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
144 See id. at 47.
145 Id. at 72–73; see also id. at 65–66 (distinguishing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976), which permitted Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the Fourteenth Amendment “operated to
alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III
and the Eleventh Amendment.”).
146 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006) (opinions in Seminole
Tribe “reflected an assumption that the holding in that case would apply to the Bank-
ruptcy Clause”); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[The
majority] prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of
actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those con-
cerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national
economy.”).
147 546 U.S. at 359.
148 Id. at 363.
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To similar effect, consider the Court’s decision in United States v.
Miller,149 rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to an indictment
for possession of a short-barreled shotgun.  The Miller Court tied the
Second Amendment’s protection of “the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms” to its recited purpose of maintaining a “well regulated
Militia”150: “With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and
render possible the effectiveness of such [militia] forces the declara-
tion and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made.  It must be
interpreted and applied with that end in view.”151  The Miller Court’s
rejection of the Second Amendment claim was based on an insuffi-
cient connection between the arms in question and a militia-related
function:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in
length” at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preser-
vation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument.152
The scope of Miller’s holding became an issue in the later case of
District of Columbia v. Heller,153 reviewing the District of Columbia’s ban
on possession of a handgun.  A key point of contention in Heller was
the precedential effect of Miller, which the dissenters read for the pro-
position that the Second Amendment “protects the right to keep and
bear arms for certain military purposes, but . . . does not curtail the
Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of
weapons.”154  The Heller majority interpreted Miller more narrowly,
understanding its holding to encompass only the proposition that the
Second Amendment did not protect a particular type of weapon (a
short-barreled shotgun), a limited conclusion that could be recon-
ciled with the majority’s view that the Second Amendment protects an
individual’s right to keep and bear certain arms for nonmilitia pur-
poses like self-defense.155
Apart from President Obama’s appointees, every recent member
of the Supreme Court joined the majority in either Katz or Heller, even
though each opinion arguably construed a prior decision more nar-
rowly than the decision’s rationale would indicate.  The majority opin-
149 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
150 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
151 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
152 Id.
153 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
154 Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 See id. at 621–22 (majority opinion).
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ion in Katz, authored by Justice Stevens, was also joined by Justices
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.156  The majority opinion in
Heller, authored by Justice Scalia, was joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.157  If the practice of nar-
rowly construing prior holdings represents an unprincipled departure
from the rule of stare decisis, then the charge of unprincipled deci-
sionmaking can be leveled quite broadly, without regard to judicial
ideology.
In my view, the respective majorities acted properly in both Katz
and Heller when they narrowly read Seminole Tribe and Miller.158  Each
Court’s effort to distinguish holding from dictum can be seen as an
application of Chief Justice Marshall’s maxim that “general expres-
sions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in
which those expressions are used,” and “[i]f they go beyond the case
. . . ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the
very point is presented for decision.”159 Seminole Tribe should not be
understood to control the outcome in a case concerning abrogation
of state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause, even if
some language in the opinion could be read to do so.  The majority in
Seminole Tribe may have assumed that its reasoning would continue to
govern in the context of federal bankruptcy legislation, but it has no
real complaint that a later Court chose to consider the question
directly on the basis of plenary briefing and argument.  An attempt by
the Seminole Tribe Court to definitively resolve the Bankruptcy Clause
issue in a case under the Indian Commerce Clause would have been
overreaching.
Similarly, Miller should not be understood to control the out-
come in a case involving application of the Second Amendment to
possession of standard firearms in the home for self-defense, even if
some language in the opinion could be read to do so.  This is perhaps
a closer question than the sovereign immunity example, since Miller
and Heller both involved possession of weapons for nonmilitary use.
However, as we will see in the sections that follow, the briefing in
Miller and the opinion in that case were such that the Court should
not be faulted for revisiting the meaning of the Second Amendment
in a case presenting full briefing and argument on the merits.  The
case for narrowly construing a prior holding becomes stronger where
156 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 358 (2006).
157 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 572.
158 I am not defending the outcome reached by the majority opinions in Katz and
Heller.  I am merely defending each opinion’s treatment of precedent.
159 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821).
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a court’s reasoning could reach distinct issues that were not ade-
quately briefed or argued by the parties.
B. Inadequate Briefing, Argument, and Deliberation
A number of Supreme Court opinions identify inadequate brief-
ing and argument as a factor justifying denial of precedential effect to
a legal proposition derived from an earlier opinion.160  For example,
in United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc.,161 a party had chal-
lenged an administrative order on the ground that the examiner’s
appointment failed to satisfy requirements that the Administrative
Procedure Act162 imposed.163  The government argued that the objec-
tion to the examiner’s appointment was untimely, having first been
raised in litigation to review the administrative order rather than the
initial agency proceeding.164  The appellee replied that the timeliness
question was foreclosed by Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,165 in which a
habeas corpus petitioner had raised the issue of Administrative Proce-
dure Act compliance in challenging an earlier deportation order.166
The Supreme Court refused to treat Wong Yang Sung as dispositive on
the timeliness question:
We need not inquire what should have been the result [in Wong
Yang Sung] had the Government denied or the Court considered
whether the objection there sustained was taken in time.  The effect
of the omission was not there raised in briefs or argument nor discussed
in the opinion of the Court.  Therefore, the case is not a binding
precedent on this point.167
The Court thus indicated that the absence of briefing and argument
played some role in the denial of stare decisis effect to Wong Yang
Sung on the timeliness issue.  The decision did not explain, though,
160 See, e.g., KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269, 279 (1936) (“But in that
case the answer did not challenge the jurisdiction, there was no assignment of error
raising the question and no argument on the subject was presented to this court.”);
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 570 (1933) (“The [Miles v. Graham] opinion
therein contains no mention of the cases supposed to have been disapproved; nor
does it show that this Court’s attention was drawn to the question whether that court
is a statutory court or a constitutional court.  In fact, as appears from the briefs, that
question was not mooted.”).
161 344 U.S. 33 (1952).
162 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
163 See L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. at 35.
164 See id.
165 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
166 See L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. at 37 (discussing Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S.
33).
167 Id. at 37–38 (emphasis added).
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how much importance one should attribute to the lack of briefing in
isolation.
If L.A. Tucker Truck Lines was the only relevant authority, one
might see poor briefing and argument as merely a cumulative factor
in stare decisis analysis.  The Court paired the absence of briefing in
Wong Yang Sung with what might be deemed a more important issue:
the earlier Court’s failure to discuss the timeliness question.  Indeed,
L.A. Tucker Truck Lines linked its stare decisis analysis to the longstand-
ing principle that the Court “is not bound by a prior exercise of juris-
diction in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub
silentio.”168  Given the obligation to raise jurisdictional issues sua
sponte, if a court’s unexplained exercise of jurisdiction does not count
as precedent, then a fortiori a decision should not count as binding
authority on other points the opinion fails to discuss.  As the Court
has written elsewhere: “Questions which merely lurk in the record,
neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not
to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute
precedents.”169
Other case law makes clear, however, that lack of full briefing and
argument, by itself, diminishes the precedential value of an opinion,
even as to issues actually addressed by the Court.  A good example is
Hohn v. United States,170 in which the Court concluded that it may
assert certiorari jurisdiction under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)171 to review denial of a certificate of
appealability.172  The Hohn Court had to deal with the stare decisis
effect of House v. Mayo, a per curiam decision holding that the Court
“lack[ed] statutory certiorari jurisdiction to review refusals to issue
certificates of probable cause.”173  The Supreme Court issues per
168 Id. at 38 & n.9 (citing United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805)
and other cases).
169 Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925); accord Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velaz-
quez, 531 U.S. 533, 557 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Judicial decisions do not stand
as binding ‘precedent’ for points that were not raised, not argued, and hence not
analyzed.”); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 232 n.6 (1995) (“Of course
the unexplained silences of our decisions lack precedential weight.”); see also Lopez v.
Monterey Cnty, 525 U.S. 266, 281 (1999) (ruling that the court was not bound by
prior assumptions, but routine assumption by courts and parties about statute’s mean-
ing supported that reading).
170 524 U.S. 236 (1998).
171 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, 40, 42 U.S.C.).
172 Hohn, 524 U.S. at 253.
173 Id. at 251 (overruling, as to this issue, House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 44 (1945)
(per curiam)).
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curiam opinions like House v. Mayo summarily, on the basis of the
initial certiorari or appeal briefing, without full briefing and argu-
ment on the merits.  The Hohn Court acknowledged that the per
curiam opinion in House was “in direct conflict” with its decision to
exercise jurisdiction,174 but it declined to follow the earlier ruling.
The Hohn majority explained: “[W]e have felt less constrained to fol-
low precedent where, as here, the opinion was rendered without full
briefing or argument.”175
Hohn relied on Gray v. Mississippi,176 which acknowledged that
“[t]he Court . . . at times has said that summary action . . . does not
have the same precedential effect as does a case decided upon full
briefing and argument.”177  Nonmajority opinions have likewise recog-
nized this limitation on stare decisis.  Justice Souter, for instance, has
said that “[s]ound judicial decisionmaking requires ‘both a vigorous
prosecution and a vigorous defense’ of the issues in dispute and a
constitutional rule announced sua sponte is entitled to less deference
than one addressed on full briefing and argument.”178  Justice Bren-
nan criticized the Court’s departure from stare decisis in another case
because “[n]one of the reasons we have hitherto deemed necessary
for departing from the doctrine of stare decisis are present,” such as
that the rejected decision “proceeded from inadequate briefing or
argumentation.”179
The quality of briefing and argument does not just affect the
weight attributed to a prior decision under stare decisis principles, but
can also help determine the scope of the earlier precedent.  In other
words, the Court seems less inclined to read a prior decision’s holding
to include aspects of the opinion that were not based on plenary brief-
ing.  In Katz, for instance, in concluding that Seminole Tribe should not
control abrogation of sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy
Clause, the Court did not feel “bound to follow our dicta in a prior
174 Id.
175 Id.  The Hohn Court noted that stare decisis has “special force in the area of
statutory interpretation.” Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 172–73 (1989)).  However, it said that the doctrine’s role is “somewhat reduced”
in the context of a procedural rule. Id. (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 521 (1995)).  It also noted that the rule in House had not been consistently fol-
lowed by the Court. Id. at 252.
176 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
177 Id. at 651 n.1 (cited by Hohn, 524 U.S. at 251).
178 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted) (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978)).
179 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 332 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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case in which the point now at issue was not fully debated.”180  Having
experienced the benefit of “[c]areful study and reflection,” the Katz
majority felt free to reconsider the language about bankruptcy cases
in the Seminole Tribe opinions.181
The Heller majority was even more explicit about the inadequacy
of the Miller briefing as a justification for its narrow reading of that
opinion.  The available briefing in Miller—which came from only one
party—paid little attention to Second Amendment history and, hence,
would not support broad conclusions about the amendment’s
meaning:
The defendants made no appearance in the case, neither filing a
brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard from no one
but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make
that case the beginning and the end of this Court’s consideration of
the Second Amendment).  The Government’s brief spent two pages
discussing English legal sources . . . . The Government’s Miller brief
thus provided scant discussion of the history of the Second Amend-
ment—and the Court was presented with no counterdiscussion.182
As a result of the substandard briefing, the Miller opinion said nothing
“about the history of the Second Amendment.”183  Consequently, the
opinion could not be read as a definitive resolution of the broader
question addressed in Heller about the Second Amendment’s
meaning.
We see then that inadequate briefing and argument can interact
with the law of precedent in two distinct ways.  As in Hohn, inadequate
briefing can give a reason for according less weight to a prior Court’s
holding.  Alternatively, as in Katz and Heller, inadequate briefing can
be a reason for reading a prior precedent narrowly, treating the hold-
ing as less expansive than it might have seemed.  Both aspects of the
law of precedent make sense in light of the nature of stare decisis and
the purposes served by briefing and argument in the decisionmaking
process.  Stare decisis offers a short cut, eliminating the need for
extended analysis of a legal issue previously resolved by the judiciary.
A court can save time and effort by citing legal conclusions from an
earlier opinion as settled for purposes of resolving the present litiga-
tion.184  However, requiring courts to rely on the work of their prede-
cessors makes less sense if we have reason to distrust the legal analysis
180 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006).
181 See id.
182 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 623–34 (2003) (citations omitted).
183 Id. at 624.
184 See CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 149 (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased R
almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case,
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in the earlier opinion.  The fact that briefing and argument in the
earlier case were inadequate tends to undermine confidence in the
legal conclusion reached by the precedent-setting court.  Since we
believe briefing and argument helps a court reach more reliable con-
clusions, we put correspondingly less faith in legal conclusions
reached without the benefit of full briefing and argument.  Similarly,
as in Hohn, we place less confidence in per curiam opinions because
the Court puts less effort into cases decided summarily, making such
decisions less reliable than those that resulted from plenary review.185
Recognition of the purposes served by briefing and argument can
help to assess the importance of briefing quality in determining the
precedential weight of a particular opinion.  In some cases, substan-
dard briefing may be outweighed by other factors in the stare decisis
analysis.  For instance, notwithstanding the inadequate briefs in South-
land Corp. v. Keating,186 a majority of the Supreme Court decided on
stare decisis grounds to adhere to Southland’s conclusion that the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act187 applies in state courts, preempting contrary
state law:
Nothing significant has changed in the 10 years subsequent to
Southland; no later cases have eroded Southland’s authority; and no
unforeseen practical problems have arisen.  Moreover, in the
interim, private parties have likely written contracts relying upon
Southland as authority.  Further, Congress, both before and after
Southland, has enacted legislation extending, not retracting, the
scope of arbitration.188
With respect to the briefing factor in particular, Justice Breyer noted
that the Southland majority had “recognized that the pre-emption
issue was a difficult one, and it considered the basic arguments that
respondents and amici now raise (even though those issues were not
and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the
courses laid by others who had gone before him.”).
185 See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 305 (“[T]he fact that the Court devotes
less time and thought to appeals disposed of summarily would in itself warrant the
inference that the Justices feel less intellectual commitment to such decisions, even
though they are a disposition on the merits.”).
186 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
187 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
188 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (declin-
ing to overrule Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)); see also id. at 283–84
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (acquiescing in erroneous Southland decision based on
reliance and other stare decisis considerations). But see id. at 295–96 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the costs of overruling Southland are not unacceptable and
state court autonomy provides special justification for reconsideration).
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thoroughly briefed at the time).”189  In these circumstances, incom-
plete briefing in Southland seemed less significant than other stare
decisis factors—such as reliance—since the poor briefing did not pre-
vent the Court from considering the principal arguments for a conclu-
sion contrary to the one the Court reached.190
C. Unreasoned or Badly Reasoned Opinions
Just as the Supreme Court has applied the law of precedent to
deny or minimize stare decisis effect when a ruling resulted from a
substandard decisionmaking process, it has also used the law of prece-
dent to enforce the discipline of careful opinion writing.  Here our
analysis will divide into three broad categorizations.  First, we will see
that when the Court has summarily disposed of a case without an opin-
ion, it has read the resulting holding particularly narrowly and has
afforded that holding diminished precedential force.  While the
Court has recognized some precedential impact for its unexplained
summary dispositions, it has treated the absence of an opinion as a
reason to significantly limit both the scope and the weight of the
resulting precedent for stare decisis purposes.  Second, where an
opinion purported to resolve or assumed the answer to a legal ques-
tion, but the analysis was conclusory or the reasoning scanty, the
Court has felt free to revisit the issue in a later case squarely present-
ing the question.  Third, in cases involving a full opinion on the mer-
its of a legal question, the Court has indicated that it is appropriate to
reconsider earlier precedent that was “badly reasoned.”
1. Dispositions Without Opinions
Before 1988, the Supreme Court operated under a significantly
broader mandatory jurisdiction than at present.  The Court was
required to issue rulings in many appeals that today would simply be
avoided through denial of a petition for writ of certiorari.191  Because
the volume of such mandatory appeals did not permit full briefing
and argument in every case, the Court adopted the practice of sum-
marily affirming many lower court decisions and summarily dismissing
189 Id. at 272 (majority opinion).
190 The fact that Southland was a statutory case presumably also influenced the
Court’s stare decisis calculus, since Congress could have corrected any error in South-
land’s analysis through a statutory amendment. See Pearson v. Callahan, 552 U.S. 223,
227 (2009) (“[C]onsiderations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory
construction, where Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legis-
lation.” (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977))).
191 See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 298–300. R
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others for want of a substantial federal question.  These summary affir-
mances and dismissals were routinely issued without any opinion from
the Court explaining its disposition.192
Though the method of handling these mandatory appeals was
comparable in some respects to the method of handling petitions for
certiorari,193 the Court’s summary rulings in such appeals have been
deemed decisions on the merits.194  Lower courts therefore needed to
know whether the Court’s summary dispositions were entitled to prec-
edential effect under rules of stare decisis.  The Supreme Court
answered in the affirmative in Hicks v. Miranda,195 concluding that a
dismissal for want of a substantial federal question constitutes a deci-
sion on the merits, and that a lower court therefore erred in disre-
garding such a ruling when it resolved a case raising related issues.196
The proper course, the Court indicated, would be for the lower court
to “ascertain what issues had been properly presented [to the
Supreme Court] and declared by this Court to be without substance”
and then to decide whether the issues in the two cases “were suffi-
ciently the same” to make the summary dismissal a “controlling prece-
dent.”197  The Court acknowledged, though, that “[a]scertaining the
reach and content of summary actions may itself present issues of real
substance.”198
The Court revisited the precedential effect of summary disposi-
tions in Mandel v. Bradley,199 clarifying that the holding of such a deci-
sion must be read narrowly to reject only “the specific challenges
presented in the statement of jurisdiction.”200 Mandel involved a dis-
pute over Maryland’s requirements for ballot access by independent
candidates not associated with a major political party.  The lower fed-
eral court in Mandel had concluded that its decision was controlled by
192 See, e.g., Bomhardt v. Maryland, 485 U.S. 950 (1988) (dismissing without opin-
ion “for want of [a] substantial federal question”); City of Manassas, Virginia v. United
States, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988) (affirming the judgment without opinion).
193 See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 298–99 (noting that most appeals were R
decided without full briefing or oral argument); id. at 300–04 (discussing factors that
might influence the Court’s decision whether to order full briefing and argument).
194 See id. at 304–10.
195 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
196 See id. at 343–44.
197 Id. at 345 n.14.
198 Id.  The Supreme Court concluded that the case was within its jurisdiction not-
withstanding the lower court’s failure to take account of the earlier summary dismis-
sal. See id. at 345–46.  The Court then resolved the case on other grounds. See id. at
348–52.
199 432 U.S. 173 (1977).
200 Id. at 176–77.
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the Supreme Court’s summary affirmance in Tucker v. Salera201 of a
lower court decision striking down Pennsylvania’s ballot access stat-
ute.202  The Supreme Court in Mandel decided that the court below
had read Salera too broadly.  Summary dispositions “prevent lower
courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues
presented and necessarily decided” by the Court.203  But when a sum-
mary disposition affirms the judgment of the court below, it does not
necessarily embrace the lower court’s reasoning.204  Such a decision
should not be read to break new ground, and its “precedential signifi-
cance” should be “assessed in the light of all of the facts in that
case.”205  Given that there was a significant difference between the
statutes in Salera and Mandel—the Pennsylvania statute had a “21-day
limitation on signature gathering,” while the Maryland statute con-
tained no such limit—the summary affirmance in Salera could not be
read as controlling the outcome in Mandel.206
Mandel shows that the absence of an opinion dramatically con-
stricts the scope of the resulting precedent.  Under the law of prece-
dent, courts narrowly construe the holding of a Supreme Court case
decided summarily without an accompanying rationale.  Other
authority indicates that the absence of an opinion greatly minimizes a
decision’s precedential weight as well.  The Supreme Court has said
that “summary affirmances have considerably less precedential value
than an opinion on the merits.”207  Thus, “upon fuller consideration
of an issue under plenary review, the Court has not hesitated to dis-
card a rule which a line of summary affirmances may appear to have
established.”208  For instance, in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,209
the Court, “having heard oral argument and entertained full brief-
ing,” decided to give plenary consideration to issues that had already
been resolved through summary affirmance in an earlier case.210
201 424 U.S. 959 (1976).
202 See Mandel, 432 U.S. at 175 (discussing Tucker, 424 U.S. 959, which summarily
affirmed Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1975)).
203 Id. at 176.
204 See id. (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391–92 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (“When we summarily affirm, without opinion, . . . we affirm the judg-
ment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached.”)).
205 Id. at 177.
206 See id.
207 Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180–81
(1979).
208 Id. at 181 (quoting Fusari, 419 U.S. at 392 (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
209 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
210 See id. at 14 (reconsidering issues resolved in Nat’l Indep. Coal Operators Ass’n
v. Brennan, 372 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d 419 U.S. 955 (1974)).
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The diminished precedential force of rulings issued without opin-
ion can be seen in Edelman v. Jordan,211 which held that the Eleventh
Amendment bars retroactive monetary relief in an action against a
state official where the award would be paid from state funds.212
While the Court thought this result consistent with some of its earlier
precedent, it also had to overrule four previous decisions approving
such retroactive relief.  In Shapiro v. Thompson,213 an Eleventh Amend-
ment objection to retroactive relief had been presented in a case sub-
ject to oral argument, though the Court, “while affirming the
judgment, did not in its opinion refer to or substantively treat the
Eleventh Amendment argument.”214  In three other cases, the Court
had summarily affirmed awards of retroactive relief “notwithstanding
Eleventh Amendment contentions made by state officers who were
appealing from the District Court judgment.”215  The Edelman Court
decided it was not bound to follow these four earlier rulings:
This case . . . is the first opportunity the Court has taken to fully
explore and treat the Eleventh Amendment aspects of such relief in
a written opinion. Shapiro v. Thompson and these three summary
affirmances obviously are of precedential value in support of the
contention that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the relief
awarded by the District Court in this case.  Equally obviously, they
are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of
this Court treating the question on the merits. . . . Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment
issue after briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh
Amendment holdings of those cases to the extent that they are
inconsistent with our holding today.216
Cases like Usery and Edelman not only show the reduced precedential
impact of decisions rendered without an opinion, but also reinforce
the point made in the previous section, that the absence of plenary
briefing and argument diminishes the weight of a precedent for stare
decisis purposes.217
211 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
212 See id. at 668–69.
213 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
214 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 670 (discussing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618).
215 Id. (citing State Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972),
aff’g 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Sterrett v. Mothers’ & Children’s Rights Org.,
409 U.S. 809 (1972), aff’g unreported order (N.D. Ind. 1972); Wyman v. Bowens, 397
U.S. 49 (1970), aff’g Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
216 Id. at 670–71.  Part of the Court’s reasoning was that stare decisis presents less
of a constraint on constitutional adjudication than in other areas of law. See id. at 671.
217 See supra Part II.B.
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The stare decisis treatment of summary dispositions highlights
some of the competing values underlying the law of precedent.  To
the extent the rule of stare decisis seeks to promote the rule of law,
preserve judicial resources, ensure that like cases receive like treat-
ment,218 and protect reliance on prior judicial rulings, one can see
why the Court would treat such summary dispositions as having prece-
dential force.  At the same time, the fact that a ruling without opinion
incurs significantly less respect than a plenary opinion issued after full
briefing and argument shows that other values are at stake in the law
of precedent.  The values supporting treatment as precedent must be
balanced against competing values, and such precedents will often
yield in the face of a judicial desire to give a legal question more care-
ful consideration in light of adversarial briefing.
2. Conclusory or Cursory Opinions
It is not just in the context of summary dispositions that the val-
ues promoted by the discipline of writing careful judicial opinions can
trump other values served by the rule of stare decisis.  We saw earlier
that the majority in District of Columbia v. Heller adopted a narrow read-
ing of the holding in United States v. Miller, in part because the briefing
in Miller was inadequate to allow broad pronouncements about the
meaning of the Second Amendment.  The Court’s restricted reading
of Miller was also premised on the sparse analysis offered in the
opinion:
It is particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it
said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough exami-
nation of the Second Amendment. . . . [T]he text of the Court’s
opinion . . . discusses none of the history of the Second Amendment.
It assumes from the prologue that the Amendment was designed to
preserve the militia (which we do not dispute), and then reviews
some historical materials dealing with the nature of the militia, and
in particular with the nature of the arms their members were
expected to possess.  Not a word (not a word) about the history of the
Second Amendment.  This is the mighty rock upon which the dis-
sent rests its case.219
In discounting the reliance prior courts had supposedly placed
on the earlier decision, the Heller majority responded, “If so, they
218 See CARDOZO, supra note 6, at 34 (“Adherence to precedent must then be the R
rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed admin-
istration of justice in the courts.”).
219 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 623–24 (2008) (citations omitted).
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overread Miller.”220  The majority thus suggested that any courts that
relied on Miller as a definitive exposition of the Second Amendment
had treated dicta as holding and placed “erroneous reliance upon an
uncontested and virtually unreasoned case.”221 Heller illustrates that,
notwithstanding broad language, the scope of a prior holding can be
restricted if it dealt with the issues in a cursory fashion reflecting
incomplete consideration or a failure to grapple with the complexities
presented.
As with inadequate briefing, incomplete analysis of an issue can
affect not only a precedent’s scope, but also its weight.  In this vein,
the Court has felt free to revisit a legal question where the answer has
been assumed in prior cases, but never “squarely addressed.”222  For
instance, in Brecht v. Abrahamson,223 the Court considered the appro-
priate harmless error standard to apply when a habeas petitioner
claimed that the prosecution had improperly commented on the
defendant’s failure to testify in violation of the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.  In at least four prior habeas corpus
cases raising such a claim, the Court had employed the same harmless
error standard applied on direct review.224  The petitioner argued
that the Court was “bound by these habeas cases, by way of stare deci-
sis,” so that it could not adopt a less stringent harmless error standard
in his case.225  The majority responded that “since we have never
squarely addressed the issue, and have at most assumed the applicabil-
ity of the [direct review] standard on habeas, we are free to address
the issue on the merits.”226
A more revealing case illustrating the diminished precedential
weight of cursory or incomplete analysis is Copperweld Corp. v. Indepen-
dence Tube Corp.,227 an antitrust case concluding that a parent corpora-
tion cannot conspire with its wholly owned subsidiary.228  The Court
in Copperweld faced a number of prior decisions recognizing an “intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine,” pursuant to which “liability is not
foreclosed merely because a parent and its subsidiary are subject to
220 Id. at 624 n.24.
221 Id.
222 Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 118 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dis-
senting); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993).
223 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
224 See id. at 630 (citing Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570 (1986); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S.
523 (1968) (per curiam)).
225 Id. at 631.
226 Id.
227 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
228 Id. at 777.
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common ownership.”229  Surveying the prior cases, the majority
stated:
In no case has the Court considered the merits of the intra-enter-
prise conspiracy doctrine in depth.  Indeed, the concept arose from
a far narrower rule.  Although the Court has expressed approval of
the doctrine on a number of occasions, a finding of intra-enterprise
conspiracy was in all but perhaps one instance unnecessary to the
result.230
The Copperweld Court acknowledged one prior case, involving two
wholly owned subsidiaries of the same parent, in which application of
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine had been necessary to the
outcome.231  That opinion “offhandedly dismissed” the argument that
parents and wholly owned subsidiaries could not conspire with one
another and “failed to confront the anomalies an intra-enterprise doc-
trine entails.”232  Given that the cases had “never explored or analyzed
in detail the justifications for such a rule,” the Court felt free to re-
examine the doctrine in the context of a parent and a wholly owned
subsidiary.233  In other words, the respect due a legal conclusion
under the principle of stare decisis depends in part on the effort the
court has put into defending its outcome.
It makes sense that incomplete or superficial analysis would affect
the weight and scope of a precedent for stare decisis purposes.  As
suggested above, written opinions improve the quality of judicial deci-
sionmaking, promote judicial accountability, and build public confi-
dence in the judicial system.  When a court’s opinion is cursory or
simplistic, failing to grapple with complexities of an issue or consider
possible counterarguments, we have less reason for confidence that
the court did the work necessary to reach a reliable conclusion and
therefore less reason to defer to the court’s decision.
3. Badly Reasoned Opinions
In addition to cases where the reasoning was cursory or sparse,
the Court has also said that it is appropriate to reconsider a precedent
that was “badly reasoned,”234 repeatedly citing Smith v. Allwright235 in
229 Id. at 759.
230 Id. at 760.
231 See id. at 763–64 (discussing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951)).
232 Id. at 763–64.
233 Id. at 766.
234 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009); United States v. Int’l Bus.
Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827
(1991).
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support of this proposition.236  In Smith, the Court overruled Grovey v.
Townsend,237 which approved the Texas Democratic Party’s practice of
holding whites-only primary elections.238 Grovey followed earlier deci-
sions striking down a Texas statute that permitted only whites to vote
in the Democratic Party primary239 and a later statute that allowed the
party’s state executive committee to determine primary voter eligibil-
ity.240  In Grovey, by contrast, the Court upheld a resolution adopted
by the state Democratic Party convention, limiting party membership
to only white citizens.241  Even on the assumption that selection as the
Democratic Party candidate was tantamount to prevailing in the gen-
eral election, the Grovey Court thought it important not to “confuse
the privilege of membership in a party with the right to vote for one
who is to hold a public office.”242  According to the Court, the state
was constitutionally bound to preserve the voting rights of African
American citizens, but party membership was a private matter with
which “the state need have no concern.”243
The Supreme Court revisited the Texas all-white primary system
in Smith, concluding that the close connection between the primary
and the general election meant that the Fifteenth Amendment
applied to the former as well as the latter:
When primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing offi-
cials, state and national, as they have here, the same tests to deter-
mine the character of discrimination or abridgement should be
applied to the primary as are applied to the general election.  If the
state requires a certain electoral procedure, prescribes a general
election ballot made up of party nominees so chosen and limits the
choice of the electorate in general elections for state offices, practi-
cally speaking, to those whose names appear on such a ballot, it
endorses, adopts and enforces the discrimination against Negroes,
practiced by a party entrusted by Texas law with the determination
of the qualifications of participants in the primary.  This is state
action within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment.244
235 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
236 See, e.g., Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. at 856; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996); Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
237 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
238 See Allwright, 321 U.S. at 664–66 (overruling Grovey, 295 U.S. 45).
239 See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927).
240 See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932).
241 See Grovey, 295 U.S. at 47, 55.
242 Id. at 55.
243 Id.
244 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944) (citing Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347, 362 (1915)).
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The Smith Court concluded that the principle of stare decisis did not
bind it to follow Grovey: “In reaching this conclusion we are not
unmindful of the desirability of continuity of decision in constitu-
tional questions.  However, when convinced of former error, this
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.”245
The Court has not explained its suggestion that Smith shows the
overruling of a “badly reasoned” precedent,246 but the thought pro-
cess is not hard to envision.  The Grovey Court’s conclusion that the
discrimination practiced against African American citizens was purely
a private matter of party membership ignored the larger pattern of
state support for such discrimination.  The scheme considered in
Grovey followed earlier state-supported attempts to exclude nonwhites
from the electoral process.  When viewed in light of the larger histori-
cal context, the arrangement reviewed by the Grovey Court can be rec-
ognized as one more in a series of collusive attempts by the State of
Texas and the Democratic Party to violate the Fifteenth Amendment.
Adhering to Grovey in light of Texas’ continuing lawlessness could
have done more to undermine the rule of law than altering a myopic
constitutional conclusion reached by the Court in an earlier opinion.
III. APPLICATION TO FUTURE SUPREME COURT CASES
We have seen that the Supreme Court uses the law of precedent
to police decisionmaking by previous Courts.  The Court sometimes
declines to follow dicta that go beyond the issues in the earlier litiga-
tion.  It also narrowly construes prior holdings or accords diminished
precedential weight where the precedent-setting Court acted without
plenary briefing and argument, or failed to offer an adequate explana-
tion for a legal conclusion.  In this section of the Article, we consider
the potential application of these principles in the context of three
issues likely to come before the Supreme Court: (1) the constitutional-
ity of laws excluding same-sex couples from the definition of “mar-
riage,” (2) the scope of supervisory liability for constitutional
violations by subordinates, and (3) state regulation of abortion prior
to fetal viability.
A. Baker v. Nelson and Same-Sex Marriage
A number of cases in recent years have involved state or federal
constitutional challenges to laws defining “marriage” in terms of male-
245 Id. at 665 (footnote omitted).
246 See supra text accompanying notes 234–36.
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female relationships.247  Federal constitutional challenges often
invoke the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.248  The Supreme Court first addressed the
constitutionality of excluding same-sex couples from state marriage
laws in its 1972 summary disposition in Baker v. Nelson.249  In Baker,
two males challenged a Minnesota court clerk’s refusal to issue a mar-
riage license.250  The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that Minnesota
law did not authorize marriage by persons of the same sex and that
denial of the marriage license did not violate federal constitutional
rights.251  The same-sex couple then took an appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, invoking the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction.252
The Jurisdictional Statement presented three questions:
1. Whether appellee’s refusal to sanctify appellants’ marriage
deprives appellants of their liberty to marry and of their prop-
erty without due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
2. Whether appellee’s refusal, pursuant to Minnesota marriage
statutes, to sanctify appellants’ marriage because both are of the
male sex violates their rights under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Whether appellee’s refusal to sanctify appellants’ marriage
deprives appellants of their right to privacy under the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments.253
In response to a motion filed by the appellee,254 the Court dismissed
the appeal without a written opinion “for want of [a] substantial fed-
eral question.”255
A recurring issue in subsequent litigation concerning same-sex
marriage has been the precedential effect of the Court’s summary dis-
missal in Baker.  As noted above, the Court has taken the position that
247 See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, Closing Arguments in Marriage Trial, N.Y. TIMES, at A15
(June 17, 2010).
248 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (find-
ing that California’s Proposition 8, returning California law to the traditional defini-
tion of marriage, violated Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses), aff’d sub nom.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
249 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
250 See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 810 (1972).
251 See id. at 186–87.
252 See Statement of Jurisdiction at 2, Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d (Feb. 11, 1972).
253 Id. at 3.
254 See Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Brief, Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d (Mar. 10, 1972).
255 Baker, 409 U.S. 810.
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a summary disposition constitutes a decision on the merits and should
generally be treated as binding precedent on issues raised by the juris-
dictional statement and necessarily resolved in disposing of the
appeal.256  Consequently, a number of lower courts have viewed Baker
as a binding precedent conclusively rejecting claims seeking to estab-
lish a right to same-sex marriage under the United States Constitu-
tion.257  Other courts have declined to treat Baker as dispositive, either
on the theory that the issues differed in the two lawsuits,258 or that the
intervening decision in Lawrence v. Texas259 altered the relevant
analysis.260
If the United States Supreme Court is again asked in a future case
to address the constitutionality of the traditional definition of mar-
riage, it could resolve the question on the basis of stare decisis, citing
Baker for the proposition that traditional marriage laws do not violate
equal protection principles or fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Such a decision would serve many of the
values underlying the law of precedent.  It would preserve stability in
256 See supra notes 193–200 and accompanying text.
257 See, e.g., McConnell v. United States, 188 Fed. App’x 540, 542 (8th Cir. 2006)
(raising same issue resolved in Baker); Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455
F.3d 859, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating there was a good reason for the restraint
displayed in Baker); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304–05 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
(holding that Baker constitutes binding precedent requiring dismissal of case); Adams
v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (stating that Baker was control-
ling, but that court would reach same conclusion de novo); Lockyer v. City of San
Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 504 (Cal. 2004) (stating that Baker sets forth federal constitu-
tional law with respect to same-sex marriage, and not undermined by Lawrence); Mor-
rison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 19–20 (Ind. App. 2005) (stating that Baker shows Court
did not think Loving supported argument by same-sex couples); Langan v. St. Vin-
cent’s Hosp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (App. Div. 2005) (finding Baker binding prece-
dent on equal protection issue); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 999 (Wash.
2006) (following Baker in rejecting claim of constitutional right to same-sex mar-
riage); see also Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 17 n.4 (N.Y. 2006) (noting that
Baker was decided after Loving, and shows that the federal due process right to mar-
riage did not extend to same-sex couples; however, does not resolve issue under state
due process clause).
258 See, e.g., Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp.2d 861, 872–73 (C.D. Cal. 2005),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 959 (2006) (holding the validity of state marriage law in Baker distinct from issue
of constitutionality of federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)); In re Kandu, 315
B.R. 123, 138 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (stating that Baker is not binding precedent
in case concerning DOMA).
259 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
260 See, e.g., Kandu, 315 B.R. at 138 (stating that Baker was not binding in part
because of potential impact of subsequent Supreme Court decisions, particularly
Lawrence).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 46 29-MAY-12 12:28
1450 notre dame law review [vol. 87:4
the law, foreclosing the potentially destabilizing impact of a decision
fundamentally restructuring an important social institution.  It would
protect reliance interests of governmental bodies that have enacted
spousal benefits legislation or employers who have entered contrac-
tual commitments in light of Baker’s affirmation of traditional mar-
riage rules.
In my view, however, the Court should not resolve such a future
case based solely on the precedential authority of Baker.  Notwith-
standing the benefits of adherence to precedent, the circumstances
surrounding the ruling in Baker suggest that the decision does not
merit treatment equivalent to a considered decision of the Court.  To
begin with, Baker was resolved without full briefing and argument.
The jurisdictional statement and the appellee’s brief, incorporating by
reference the opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court, offered a
competent summary of the constitutional issues.261  Nevertheless, ple-
nary briefing and argument would have permitted more extensive
development of the questions in dispute.  More importantly, setting
the case for oral argument would have guaranteed extended consider-
ation of the constitutional questions surrounding same-sex marriage
over a period of months.  Instead, the Court resolved the case through
a procedure akin to the process for a denial of certiorari.
The absence of a written opinion in Baker offers an additional
reason to deny controlling effect to the decision in future Supreme
Court proceedings on the issue.  Even if the Court had thoroughly
considered the constitutional issues raised in Baker, it offered no writ-
ten explanation for the decision dismissing the appeal.262  The Jus-
tices thus avoided the disciplinary effect of writing a reasoned opinion
and the accountability ensured by internal and external scrutiny of
the majority’s explanation for a constitutional ruling.  Resolution of
an issue with significant consequences for the parties and the public
merits more than a one-sentence, unexplained rejection of the argu-
ments advanced.
To argue that the Court should not treat Baker as controlling its
decision through the force of stare decisis does not necessarily mean
Baker would be irrelevant in proceedings seeking to establish a right to
same-sex marriage.  Decisions that do not control the outcome of a
case may nevertheless be treated as persuasive authority.  Perhaps the
Supreme Court’s alacrity in rejecting constitutional arguments for
261 See Statement of Jurisdiction, supra note 252, at 11–19; Appellee’s Motion to
Dismiss Appeal and Brief, supra note 254, at 3–7; see also id. at 9–14 (opinion of Min-
nesota Supreme Court).
262 See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).
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same-sex marriage less than forty years ago might have some bearing
on the issue of whether a rational basis exists for laws limiting mar-
riage to opposite sex couples.  Or perhaps the decision in Baker, com-
ing just five years after Loving v. Virginia,263 offers contemporaneous
evidence of how the Court understood the scope and implications of
its Loving decision.  If so, however, these are matters the Court should
address in a reasoned opinion, following plenary briefing and
extended deliberation, without the constraints of stare decisis.
More broadly, our discussion of Baker calls into question the prin-
ciple of Hicks v. Miranda, treating summary affirmances and dismissals
as binding precedent entitled to stare decisis effect.264  Applying stare
decisis in such circumstances prevents lower courts from giving full
consideration to legal questions resolved in haste by the Supreme
Court.  The decision to address an issue summarily, without a written
opinion, shows that the Court gave the question relatively short shrift.
Just as we do not accord precedential weight to a denial of certiorari,
the Court should abandon Hicks and deny controlling force to unex-
plained summary dispositions.  Such opinions could be taken into
account as persuasive authority, but not in a way that constrains ple-
nary reflection on legal arguments treated in a cursory fashion by the
Supreme Court.  In this situation, the value of allowing thorough con-
sideration of a legal question outweighs any enhanced legal stability
that flows from requiring lower courts to decipher unexplained rul-
ings and treat them as binding authority.
B. Supervisory Liability Under Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Much attention has been paid to the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,265 a potentially far reaching opinion on
pleading requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.266
Some observers believe the opinion also set a major precedent on a
second issue—the scope of liability for supervisory personnel sued
263 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating state law prohibiting interracial marriage).
264 See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text. R
265 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
266 See generally Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Com-
ment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) (discussing the “two-
pronged approach” Iqbal adds doctrinally to Twombly); Comment, Pleading Standards,
123 HARV. L. REV. 252, 253 (2009) (suggesting Iqbal subtly strengthened the plausibil-
ity standard, effectively adding a probability requirement). But see David L. Noll, The
Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117 (2010) (arguing Iqbal may be less significant
than some commentators suggest).
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when their subordinates commit constitutional violations.267  The dis-
senters in Iqbal claimed that the majority had completely eliminated
any theory of “supervisory liability,” defined as a supervisor’s legal
accountability “under certain conditions, for the wrongdoing of his
subordinates.”268  The principal dissent took particular exception to
the majority’s decision “to proceed without briefing and argument”
on the supervisory liability question,269 and contended that Iqbal’s dis-
cussion of supervisory liability was unnecessary in that it had no appar-
ent impact on the outcome of the case.270  I agree with the dissent’s
suggestion that the majority’s statements regarding supervisory liabil-
ity may constitute dicta, given the Court’s analysis of the pleadings.  In
any event, to the extent there was a holding on the issue of supervisory
liability, a later Court could fairly choose to read the Iqbal precedent
narrowly in light of the minimal briefing on the question.
The Iqbal litigation involved claims brought by a Muslim citizen
of Pakistan under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics.271  Iqbal contended that federal officials violated the Con-
stitution, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when
they detained him on immigration-related charges, held him in a
restrictive form of custody and subjected him to beatings and other
mistreatment, while investigating whether he had any connection to
the terrorists.272  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Iqbal addressed
whether the complaint stated a claim against two high ranking federal
officials, Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI director Robert
Mueller, sufficient to survive their assertion of a qualified immunity
defense.273
The central allegations directed at Ashcroft and Mueller were
that they “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
267 See Richard Frankel, The Failure of Analogy in Conceptualizing Private Entity Liabil-
ity Under Section 1983, 78 UMKC L. REV. 967, 988 (2010) (“Although Iqbal has received
significant attention for its potential effect on notice pleading, it also may have signifi-
cant implications for the doctrine of supervisory employee liability under § 1983 and
Bivens.”); Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability
After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279, 280 (2010) (“Ashcroft v. Iqbal is obviously an
extremely important federal pleading decision.  But it is significant for another, per-
haps less obvious, reason: the Court’s conditioning of supervisory liability under both
§ 1983 and Bivens—Iqbal involved Bivens-type claims—on constitutional violations by
supervisors themselves.” (footnotes omitted)).
268 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting).
269 Id. at 1958.
270 See id.
271 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
272 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943–44.
273 See id. at 1942–43.
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subject’ [Iqbal] to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national ori-
gin and for no legitimate penological interest.’”274  The majority ana-
lyzed Iqbal’s complaint in light of the pleading standards of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,275 which requires allegation of facts sufficient
to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”276  To the extent
Iqbal challenged high-level policy decisions made by Ashcroft and
Mueller, the majority rejected some of the complaint’s allegations as
“conclusory.”277  The nonconclusory factual allegations, such as the
claim that thousands of Arab Muslim men were detained during the
September 11 investigation, did not plausibly show a policy of pur-
poseful discrimination under Twombly.278  This was true, the majority
believed, because a “more likely” and “obvious” explanation existed
for the disproportionate detention of Arab Muslims; given that the
hijackers, the leader of al Qaeda, and a large segment of the organiza-
tion were Arab Muslims, a disparate impact could be expected to flow
from a “nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally
present in the United States and who had potential connections to
those who committed terrorist acts.”279
The Iqbal majority acknowledged that “[r]espondent’s account of
his prison ordeal could, if proved, demonstrate unconstitutional mis-
conduct by some governmental actors.”280  The complaint identified
“discrete wrongs—for instance, beatings—by lower level Government
actors” that “if true, and if condoned by petitioners, could be the basis
for some inference of wrongful intent on petitioners’ part.”281  Apply-
ing Second Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals in Iqbal had iden-
tified various ways in which supervisory personnel may be held liable
under Bivens:
The personal involvement of a supervisor may be established by
showing that he (1) directly participated in the violation, (2) failed
to remedy the violation after being informed of it by report or
appeal, (3) created a policy or custom under which the violation
occurred, (4) was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who
committed the violation, or (5) was deliberately indifferent to the
274 Id. at 1951 (second alteration in original) (quoting First Amended Jury Com-
plaint at 17–18, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (04 CV 1809 (JG)(JA)).
275 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
276 Id. at 570.
277 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
278 See id.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 1942.
281 Id. at 1952.
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rights of others by failing to act on information that constitutional
rights were being violated.282
In addition to Iqbal’s challenge to the policies implemented by Ash-
croft and Mueller, therefore, the majority had to consider whether the
complaint stated a claim that might render those defendants liable
based on the unconstitutional acts of subordinate federal officials.
The majority started with respondent’s concession that “Govern-
ment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct
of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”283  From
there, the majority reasoned that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inap-
plicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.”284  Indeed, the majority
thought the term “supervisory liability” a “misnomer”: “Absent vicari-
ous liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstand-
ing, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”285  Applying this
principle to a discrimination claim, the majority thought allegations
that a supervisor knew of discriminatory conduct by his subordinates
would not suffice.  Discriminatory “purpose rather than knowledge is
required.”286  Accordingly, “petitioners cannot be held liable unless
they themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected char-
acteristic.  Yet respondent’s complaint does not contain any factual
allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory
state of mind.”287
The dissenters argued that the majority’s conclusion need not fol-
low from its premises.  The majority’s analysis, according to Justice
Souter,
rests on the assumption that only two outcomes are possible here:
respondeat superior liability, in which “an employer is subject to liabil-
ity for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope
of their employment,” or no supervisory liability at all.  The dichot-
omy is false.  Even if an employer is not liable for the actions of his
employee solely because the employee was acting within the scope
of employment, there still might be conditions to render a supervi-
sor liable for the conduct of his subordinate.288
282 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
283 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 1949.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 1952.
288 Id. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2005)); see also Frankel, supra note 267, at 990 (“As the
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The dissent noted that the lower courts had applied “quite a spectrum
of possible tests for supervisory liability,” including some mentioned
by the Second Circuit, and complained that “we have received no
briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory liability,
much less the full-dress argument we normally require.”289
If the Supreme Court takes a future case concerning the liability
of supervisory federal officials under Bivens or supervisory state offi-
cials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, would the Court be bound by the Iqbal
opinion and, if so, what legal propositions does the opinion establish?
At the very least, the Iqbal opinion would seem to include dicta to the
extent it purports to rule on the scope of supervisory liability of state
officials under § 1983.  While Bivens and § 1983 are sometimes inter-
preted in tandem, the latter is a statutory cause of action while the
former has been implied by courts as a matter of federal common
law.290  The language or history of § 1983 could compel results on the
supervisory liability question at odds with the outcome applicable to
federal officials under Bivens.291  Consequently, Iqbal would seem an
inappropriate vehicle for definitive resolution of the supervisory liabil-
ity issue under § 1983.
With respect to the scope of supervisory liability under Bivens, the
dissent makes a reasonable argument that the Iqbal majority’s “conclu-
sion ha[d] no bearing on its resolution of the case.”292  A major point
of difference between the majority’s analysis and that of some lower
courts concerned the mental state required to establish the liability of
supervisory personnel.  The Iqbal majority seemed to indicate that a
supervisor’s knowledge of unconstitutional discrimination by a
subordinate cannot give rise to liability unless the supervisor himself
engaged in purposeful discrimination—in other words, unless the
supervisor’s response to the subordinate’s discrimination itself vio-
lated the Constitution.293  Some lower courts, on the other hand,
including the Second Circuit in this case, have indicated that supervi-
sors may be held liable based on a lesser mental state, such as gross
negligence, deliberate indifference, or knowledge of unconstitutional
dissent pointed out, there is a significant difference between the traditional form of
respondeat superior liability rejected in Monell and the supervisory liability rejected in
Iqbal.”).
289 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957–58 (Souter, J., dissenting).
290 See Nahmod, supra note 267, at 303 (contending that arguments from lan-
guage and legislative history of § 1983 would not apply to federal common law action
under Bivens).
291 See id. at 298–303.
292 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting).
293 See id. at 1949; Nahmod, supra note 267, at 291.
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activity combined with a failure to respond.294  As Justice Souter per-
suasively noted, “[t]he majority says that all of the allegations in the
complaint that Ashcroft and Mueller authorized, condoned, or even
were aware of their subordinates’ discriminatory conduct are ‘con-
clusory’ and therefore are ‘not entitled to be assumed true.’”295  Con-
sequently, the majority’s discussion of the mental state required for
supervisory liability would seem to have no bearing on the outcome of
the case.  None of the allegations deemed nonconclusory by the
majority showed a mental state that could have given rise to supervi-
sory liability under the prevailing tests in the lower courts.  On this
ground, the majority’s statements concerning supervisory liability
might reasonably be classified as nonbinding dicta, even with respect
to an action under Bivens.296
Even if one thought Iqbal’s discussion of supervisory liability
should be read to embrace some holding,297 there remains the ques-
tion of how broadly that holding should be read.  The dissent’s com-
plaint about the absence of briefing and argument becomes relevant
here.  If the briefing really was inadequate, a future Court might rea-
sonably apply an analysis like that in Heller, where the majority nar-
rowly construed Miller’s Second Amendment holding because of the
one-sided and cursory briefing available to the Court.298
Examining the parties’ briefs in Iqbal, the principal dissent
appears to engage in a bit of hyperbole when it claims that “we have
received no briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory
294 See Nahmod, supra note 267, at 293; supra text accompanying note 282.
295 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting).
296 See Nahmod, supra note 267, at 292 (suggesting dissent was probably “attempt-
ing to render as dicta” the majority’s discussion of supervisory liability).
297 One could take the position, for instance, that the majority’s discussion of
supervisory liability, though not outcome determinative, formed a logically “necessary”
foundation for consideration of the pleading issues the Court took up in Iqbal.  In
order to decide whether the complaint stated a claim against Ashcroft and Mueller, it
made sense to first “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim
of unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled to assert the defense of
qualified immunity.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947.  The dissenters believed the petitioners
had conceded they could be held liable under a “deliberate indifference” standard,
and that this concession should have foreclosed consideration of the supervisory lia-
bility question. See id. at 1956–57 (Souter, J., dissenting).  But the concession hardly
counted as a complete resolution of the supervisory liability issue, given other stan-
dards that might apply.  Apart from the concession, the dissenters acknowledged that
“without knowing the elements of a supervisory liability claim, there would be no way
to determine whether a plaintiff had made factual allegations amounting to grounds
for relief on that claim.” Id. at 1956.
298 See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
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liability.”299  The Brief for the Petitioners included a section of several
pages under the heading, “Any Supervisory Liability Permitted Under
Bivens Must Be Strictly Limited.”300  The government argued that
“[t]he logic of Bivens . . . permits high-level federal officials to be held
liable only for their direct involvement in constitutional violations, or
(at most) their deliberate indifference in the face of information that
the rights of others are being violated.”301  Relying on both precedent
and policy arguments, the government critiqued Second Circuit case
law seemingly envisioning liability where the supervisor lacked actual
knowledge of wrongdoing.302
However, if the Iqbal dissenters overreached in suggesting a com-
plete absence of briefing on supervisory liability, they do seem correct
that the Court lacked the benefit of “the full-dress argument we nor-
mally require” on the supervisory liability issue.303  The government’s
opening brief spent only a few pages on the standard for supervisory
liability.304  Rather than defending the Second Circuit case law chal-
lenged by the government, the respondent merely identified what he
characterized as points of agreement with the petitioners:
[I]t is important to note the many areas of agreement among the
parties as to the substantive law governing supervisory Bivens liabil-
ity.  First, it is undisputed that supervisory Bivens liability cannot be
established solely on a theory of respondeat superior.  Second, and
relatedly, all agree that a supervisor must take some affirmative act
(or legally actionable omission) that contributes to or causes the
constitutional violation alleged by a plaintiff.  Third, petitioners
agree that a supervisor’s knowing acquiescence to subordinates’
unconstitutional conduct is enough to establish supervisory liability.
Finally, if a supervisor takes affirmative steps to create a facially
unconstitutional policy, to be applied by subordinates, this too will
establish supervisory liability.305
Based on these purported points of agreement, respondent then
sought to show that the complaint stated a claim against petition-
ers.306  As a result, the Court did not have the benefit of briefs argu-
ing, for instance, that grossly negligent supervision should constitute a
299 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting).
300 Brief for the Petitioners at 44–50, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015).
301 Id. at 44.
302 See id. at 44–46.
303 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting).
304 See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 300, at 44–47.
305 Brief for Respondent Javaid Iqbal at 46, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015)
(citations omitted).
306 See id. at 46–55.
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basis for recovery under Bivens, or the adoption of a facially constitu-
tional policy that lends itself to unconstitutional application.
The supervisory liability issue is one on which plenary briefing
might assist the Court in reaching a well considered decision.  In
determining the scope of a supervisor’s liability under Bivens, at least
two sources of law interact—the requirements of the Constitution and
federal common law.307  The corresponding statutory issues under
§ 1983 add another layer of complexity.308  Particularly since the inad-
equate briefing in Iqbal concerned an issue on which appellate courts
have reached differing conclusions,309 it would be appropriate for a
future Court to construe the precedential impact of Iqbal narrowly.
For instance, the Court could view the case as simply applying well-
settled constitutional standards for equal protection liability, but leav-
ing unresolved the issue of whether federal common law might
impose prophylactic requirements on supervisory personnel going
beyond the requirements imposed by the Constitution itself.310  I am
not arguing that the Court should necessarily reach a different result
than it did in Iqbal.  I merely contend that the issue is sufficiently
involved that a future Court should view itself as largely unencum-
bered by the Iqbal precedent when parties submit plenary briefing
contesting the scope of supervisory liability under Bivens or, especially,
§ 1983.
C. The Viability Rule of Roe and Casey
The third issue we will examine under the law of precedent con-
cerns the authority of states to regulate abortion prior to fetal “viabil-
ity.”  The term “viability” refers to a stage in prenatal development
when a fetus could potentially survive outside the womb with medical
assistance.311  The significance of viability for state regulation of abor-
307 See Nahmod, supra note 267, at 303 (arguing that the Court could have
reached a different conclusion in Iqbal based on federal common law, but instead
adopted a constitutional approach).
308 See id. at 298–303 (discussing relevant language and legislative history of
§ 1983).
309 See id. at 292–93 (opining that it is “surprising from a process perspective” that
the majority ruled without briefing and argument and “particularly troubling”
because most circuit courts had adopted a different approach).
310 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“[R]espondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowl-
edge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violat-
ing the Constitution.”).
311 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (discussing “the interim point at
which the fetus becomes ‘viable,’ that is, potentially able to live outside the mother’s
womb, albeit with artificial aid”).
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tion derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade.312 Roe
indicated that states may only regulate to protect fetal life after the
fetus becomes viable.313
Decisions since 1989 show a gradual diminution of the signifi-
cance attributed to fetal viability in the Supreme Court’s abortion
jurisprudence.  In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,314 even though
the trial court found that viability does not occur until twenty-three
and a half or twenty-four weeks into pregnancy, a splintered majority
upheld a Missouri statute that created a presumption of viability at
twenty weeks and required a physician to order additional tests if nec-
essary to make a viability determination.315  Three years later, the con-
trolling plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey316 reaffirmed the viability rule in dicta, but in a
significantly diluted form.  The Casey plurality acknowledged a state
interest in protecting fetal life from the outset of the pregnancy—not
just after viability as the Court had indicated in Roe—and permitted
previability regulations so long as they do not create an “undue bur-
den” on abortion rights.317  More recently, in Gonzales v. Carhart,318
312 See id. at 163–64.
313 See id. (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in poten-
tial life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.  This is so because the fetus then presum-
ably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.  State regulation
protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.
If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to
proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life
or health of the mother.”).
314 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (plurality opinion).
315 See id. at 515 (stating that the statute “creates what is essentially a presumption
of viability at 20 weeks, which the physician must rebut with tests indicating that the
fetus is not viable prior to performing an abortion”).  Chief Justice Rehnquist
authored a three-Justice plurality opinion rejecting the lower courts’ reading of the
statute to require testing even if the tests would not be useful to determining viability
or would endanger the mother or fetus. See id. at 514–15.  The plurality thought the
viability rule cast doubt on even this restricted reading of the statute, see id. at 517, but
could “not see why the State’s interest in protecting potential human life should come
into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid
line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.” Id. at
519.  Justice O’Connor thought the statute, as read by the plurality, could be recon-
ciled with Roe and subsequent cases, so that no reconsideration of Roe was necessary.
See id. at 525–31 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
The fifth vote to sustain the statute came from Justice Scalia, who thought the Court
should overrule Roe outright. Id. at 532–37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
316 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
317 See id. passim.
318 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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the Court upheld federal legislation forbidding use of the intact dila-
tion and evacuation method of abortion, even though the ban applied
prior to fetal viability.319  While the majority “assume[d]” the contin-
ued applicability of the viability rule,320 the principal dissent accused
the majority of “blur[ring] the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between
previability and postviability abortions.”321
The current vitality of the viability rule will presumably be a sig-
nificant issue in litigation over recent state statutes forbidding abor-
tions after twenty weeks of pregnancy.  Following the lead of
Nebraska, a number of states have now prohibited most abortions
after twenty weeks, arguing that a fetus at that stage of development
can feel pain as a result of the abortion procedure.322  As suggested by
the opinions in Webster, some fetuses protected by a twenty-week
threshold will likely fall short of viability.323
If the Supreme Court accepts a case turning on the duration of
abortion rights, a strong argument can be made that the Court should
not consider itself bound to apply the viability rule as a matter of pre-
cedent.  To begin with, the issue of the duration of abortion rights was
not before the Court in Roe.  The Roe litigation involved a challenge to
a Texas statute that prohibited all abortions except those necessary to
save the mother’s life.324  Once the Court concluded that a woman
has a fundamental right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy and
that the states lack a compelling interest in protecting fetal life at the
outset of pregnancy, the invalidity of the statute was established
regardless of how far into pregnancy the right to an abortion
extends.325  The validity of the Texas statute did not turn on the ques-
tion of when in pregnancy a state may regulate to protect fetal life.
Consequently, the Court’s articulation of the viability rule constituted
dictum, unnecessary to resolve the case before the Court.
319 See id. at 147, 168.
320 See id. at 146.
321 Id. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
322 See Monica Davey, Nebraska, Citing Pain, Sets Limits on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2010, at A16; Erik Eckholm, New Laws in 6 States Ban Abortions After 20 Weeks, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2011, at A10.
323 The viability rule might also become an issue in litigation arising from recent
Oklahoma legislation forbidding sex-selective abortions.  Drew Zahn, New Law Bans
Picking Baby’s Sex by Abortion, WORLD NET DAILY (May 23, 2009, 12:00 AM), www.wnd.
com/2009/05/98886.
324 See Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (per curiam)
(quoting Texas Penal Code arts. 1191, 1196), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester
Framework, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 505, 509–10 (2012).
325 See Beck, supra note 324, at 512–15.
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The Court’s internal deliberations in Roe confirm that the viabil-
ity rule represented an attempt to resolve an issue not presented by
the pending litigation.326  The files of Justice Blackmun and other
retired Justices show that the viability rule did not make its way into
the Roe opinion until the third draft circulated to the Court.  The first
draft would have invalidated the Texas statute on vagueness grounds,
while the companion opinion in Doe v. Bolton327 would have recog-
nized a constitutional right to abortion of unspecified duration.328
The second draft of Roe (following reargument of the case) rested its
analysis on a constitutional right to abortion, but indicated that this
right would last only through the first trimester of pregnancy.329  Jus-
tice Blackmun’s cover memorandum accompanying this draft
acknowledged that the opinion “contains dictum” and that the pro-
posed first-trimester cutoff point “is arbitrary, but perhaps any other
selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary.”330
Justice Stewart subsequently commented on this second draft of Roe,
noting:
One of my concerns with your opinion as presently written is the
specificity of its dictum—particularly in its fixing of the end of the first
trimester as the critical point for valid state action.  I appreciate the
inevitability and indeed wisdom of dicta in the Court’s opinion, but
I wonder about the desirability of the dicta being quite so inflexibly
“legislative.”331
The viability rule appeared in the third draft of Roe, replacing the
first-trimester line drawn in the previous version.332  Justice Black-
mun’s acknowledgement that Roe’s second draft included dictum, Jus-
tice Stewart’s identification of the first-trimester cutoff as part of that
opinion’s dicta, and the fact that the third draft’s shift to a viability
cutoff did not alter the Court’s analysis all show the majority’s aware-
ness that adoption of the viability rule was unnecessary to review of the
Texas statute.  Indeed, at least two other Justices in the majority made
326 See Randy Beck, Fueling Controversy, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 735, 738–41 (2011–12).
327 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
328 See Beck, supra note 324, at 517.
329 See id. at 520.
330 Id. (quoting Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Memorandum to the Conference Re: No.
70-18–Roe v. Wade (Nov. 21, 1972), in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Box 151, Folder 6 [hereinafter Blackmun Papers]); accord DAVID
J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 580 (1994).
331 Beck, supra note 324, at 525 (quoting Justice Potter Stewart, Memorandum re:
Abortion Cases (Dec. 14, 1972), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 330); see GARROW,
supra note 330, Folder 8 at 585.
332 See Beck, supra note 324, at 525–26.
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comments in internal memoranda indicating that the Roe Court did
not need to draw a line specifying the duration of abortion rights.333
Given that the duration of abortion rights was not really at issue
in Roe, it is perhaps no surprise that the parties failed to brief the
question.  Those challenging the Texas statute denied that the state
possessed a compelling interest in fetal life that would support the
legislation as written but did not speculate about whether a more nar-
rowly drawn statute might further such an interest.334  The defenders
of the statute claimed a compelling state interest in protecting fetal
life from the outset of pregnancy.335  The parties did not address the
question of, assuming a right to abortion, how far into pregnancy it
extends, and the advocates in oral argument avoided answering such
line-drawing questions.336  The Roe Court therefore adopted the via-
bility rule without the benefit of adversarial briefing or argument on
the duration of abortion rights.
The lack of support for the viability rule in the Roe opinion pro-
vides an additional reason for according that line diminished prece-
dential weight.  As Justice Breyer has argued in discussing the Dred
Scott opinion, “in a highly visible, politically controversial case with
public feeling running high,” the Court’s opinion should be “princi-
pled, reasoned, transparent, and informative.”337  With respect to the
“highly visible, politically controversial” Roe opinion, however, schol-
ars have long recognized that the Court utterly failed to justify the
viability rule.  Professor John Hart Ely explained soon after the opin-
ion’s release that Roe’s discussion of viability “seem[ed] to mistake a
definition for a syllogism.”338  As I sought to elaborate Ely’s point else-
where, “[t]he Court failed to offer any constitutional principle con-
necting state regulatory power and the value of developing fetal life
that—when combined with the Court’s definition of viability—would
entail the conclusion that the state can only prohibit abortion of a
viable fetus.”339  Other scholars have agreed with Ely’s assessment,
including Laurence Tribe, who wrote that the Roe Court “offers no
333 See, e.g., id. at 516–17 (quoting Justice Brennan); id. at 522 (quoting Justice
Powell); see also id. at 521 (quoting Justice Powell’s clerk).
334 See id. at 511.
335 See id.
336 See id. at 511–12.
337 See BREYER, supra note 18, at 43 (discussing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 R
How.) 393 (1857)).
338 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 924 (1973).
339 Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249, 270
(2009).
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reason at all for what the Court has held,”340 and Christopher Eis-
gruber, who termed the Roe Court’s defense of the viability rule “bla-
tantly circular.”341
While the Casey plurality purported to reaffirm the viability rule,
in part on the basis of stare decisis, it did not cure the defects in the
Roe Court’s defense of the rule.  To begin with, as in Roe, the Penn-
sylvania regulations at issue in Casey applied from the outset of preg-
nancy.  As a consequence, the reaffirmation of the viability rule in
Casey also represented dictum, unnecessary to resolution of the issues
before the Court.342  Moreover, the parties in Casey did not brief the
Court on potential arguments for or objections to the viability rule.343
In attempting to justify the viability rule, the Casey plurality
asserted that viability marks “the independent existence of [a] second
life” that “can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protec-
tion that now overrides the rights of the woman.”344  This cryptic and
conclusory justification left unaddressed a host of critical questions.
The plurality never explained why independence should be a neces-
sary condition for protection by the state; why the particular form of
hypothetical independence denoted by the term “viability” should be
the form of independence that matters (rather than genetic indepen-
dence at conception or independence of movement at quickening);
or how this independent existence requirement can be derived from
the Constitution.345  Consequently, Casey did not rectify Roe’s failure
to justify the viability rule in constitutional terms.346
In short, the viability rule falls into the category of legal rules that
the Court has repeatedly invoked, and even applied, but never
“squarely addressed.”347  Like the habeas corpus harmless error stan-
dard considered in Brecht and the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
340 Id. at 269 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1973)).
341 Id. (quoting Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Constitution,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 96 & n.171 (1995)).
342 See Randy Beck, The Essential Holding of Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75 UMKC L.
REV. 713, 717 (2007).
343 See id. at 718 (“[S]ince viability was not relevant to the constitutionality of the
challenged Pennsylvania regulations, potential justifications for the viability rule
played no more than a de minimis role in the parties’ briefs.”).
344 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
345 See Beck, supra note 339, at 275–76.
346 See id. at 276.  The Court’s subsequent opinion in Gonzales, permitting states to
afford some legal protection to a previable fetus, makes a plausible constitutional jus-
tification for the viability rule even more difficult to envision. Id. at 276–79.
347 See supra notes 222–33 and accompanying text.
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addressed in Copperweld,348 the Court should not view the viability rule
as binding precedent precluding future examination of the duration
of abortion rights on the basis of plenary briefing and argument.  To
be binding on future Courts, a ruling on a matter of such conse-
quence as the duration of the constitutional right to abortion should
be the product of careful deliberation and adequate justification in a
case where the ruling matters to the outcome of the litigation.  Absent
these conditions, the viability rule does not warrant treatment as bind-
ing precedent entitled to adherence as a matter of stare decisis.
CONCLUSION
The judiciary’s power to establish precedent serves important
functions, making the law more stable and enhancing its ability to
influence conduct.  But our system has always distrusted excessive con-
centrations of power.  It is not surprising, then, to find that the power
conferred on precedent-setting courts is qualified and limited, and
that the law of precedent empowers later judges to ignore or limit the
reach of opinions issued under suboptimal decisionmaking condi-
tions.  These limitations on the rule of stare decisis allow later judges
to check the authority of their predecessors and help to confine the
precedent-setting power to those situations where it can be exercised
most responsibly.
348 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993); Copperweld Corp. v.
Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 766–67 (1984).
